(Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections by Douglas, Joshua A.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 92 Issue 3 
2015 
(Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections 
Joshua A. Douglas 
University of Kentucky College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Election Law Commons, Law and Politics Commons, and the Political Science Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)Trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553 (2015). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
553 
Washington University 
Law Review 
 
VOLUME 92 NUMBER 3 2015  
 
 (MIS)TRUSTING STATES TO RUN ELECTIONS 
JOSHUA A. DOUGLAS

 
INTRODUCTION 
Recent Supreme Court election law jurisprudence reflects an unspoken, 
pernicious trend. Without identifying a specific new rule, the Court has 
been unjustifiably deferring to state laws regarding election 
administration, thereby giving states tremendous power to regulate 
elections. At the same time, the Court has diminished Congress’s 
oversight role. That is a mistake. Placing too much power in states to 
administer elections is both constitutionally wrong and practically 
dangerous.  
During the past few years the Court has considered many controversial 
election-related issues, from voter identification
1
 to campaign finance
2
 to 
race relations and the Voting Rights Act.
3
 The majorities in these cases 
have generally deferred to states to run elections as they see fit. The Court 
has employed light-touch judicial review to state election administration 
laws while at the same time subjecting federal election rules to higher 
scrutiny. 
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 1. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 2. See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 3. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
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Although not explicitly part of its analysis, the Court has been 
deferring to states in two ways, one substantive and the other procedural. 
First, the Court has accepted almost any assertion of a state interest to 
protect the integrity of the election, failing to dig deeper into the actual 
rationale for the state’s regulation of the voting process. This differs from 
the Court’s approach to federal election statutes and is contrary to 
historical practice.
4
 Second, the Court has discouraged facial challenges to 
state voting laws but has sustained facial challenges to congressional 
enactments, thereby using a procedural mechanism to uphold state rules 
and invalidate federal laws.
5
 These two themes, both unstated, infiltrate 
the recent case law. They also help to reconcile the Court’s seemingly 
disjointed election law jurisprudence.  
The Court has deferred to states substantively by failing to scrutinize 
the actual rationale behind a voting rule. When considering the first prong 
of the constitutional test and assessing the state’s interest, the Court has 
credited at face value a state’s general assertions of “election integrity.”6 
The Court has failed to probe the underlying, more specific reason for a 
law, which is often to gain partisan advantage for the majority party. At 
the same time, it has scrutinized more carefully Congress’s justifications 
for its voting regulations.
7
 Thus, the Court is treating state election 
administration rules differently, giving less meaningful scrutiny to a 
state’s voting processes. 
Procedurally, the Court has deferred to state election administration 
laws through its approach to facial and as-applied challenges.
8
 A facial 
challenge is a claim that the law is unconstitutional in all of its 
applications, whereas an as-applied challenge asserts the invalidity of the 
law only with respect to how it operates as to that specific plaintiff.
9
 At 
first glance, it is difficult to reconcile the interpretation of this procedural 
question in cases such as Shelby County (Voting Rights Act), Citizens 
United (campaign finance), and Crawford (voter ID), as well as other 
 
 
 4. See infra Part I.A. 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part I.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2628–30. The only area in which this differential 
deferral has not occurred consistently is campaign finance, where the Court has been skeptical of both 
Congress and the states. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 333; Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 
253–62 (2006). 
 8. For an extensive discussion of the difference between facial and as-applied challenges in 
election law, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Significance of the Shift Toward As-Applied Challenges in 
Election Law, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 635, 639–42 (2009). 
 9. See Alex Kreit, Making Sense of Facial and As-Applied Challenges, 18 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 657, 657 (2010). 
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lower-profile decisions,
10
 because the analysis has diverged markedly 
regarding the propriety of facial or as-applied challenges. But a closer look 
reveals an interesting trend: the Court validates only piecemeal, as-applied 
litigation for state voting rules but will sustain broad facial challenges to 
other election laws. The usual result is judicial sanctioning of state voting 
regulations but a concurrent invalidation of federal election rules. This 
framework provides a procedural mechanism for the Court to defer to state 
election administration. 
The Court’s broad deference to state voting rules is concerning for two 
main reasons. First, it is doctrinally inconsistent with the structure of the 
United States Constitution. Second, it is alarming given the increasing 
number of restrictive and partisan-laden voting laws states are enacting. 
Deferring to states while more closely questioning Congress’s 
justifications for an election rule is inconsistent with our constitutional 
design. The Court’s shift of power from Congress to the states to regulate 
elections is wrong under the U.S. Constitution, which provides that states 
run elections but that Congress has important oversight responsibilities.
11
 
The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution says so explicitly: the states 
shall “prescribe[]” the “Times, Places, and Manner” of holding elections 
for federal office, but Congress can “make or alter” such regulations as it 
deems necessary.
12
 Further, the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as other 
voting-specific amendments, provides enforcement power to Congress to 
ensure equality in voting.
13
 This means, quite pointedly, that the federal 
government plays an important oversight role in how our elections 
operate. The current judicial approach, however, elevates a state’s role and 
minimizes the ability of Congress to oversee the election process. 
The Court’s approach is also dangerous, as it emboldens state 
legislatures to enact partisan voting rules in an effort to influence electoral 
outcomes. States across the country, particularly where one party controls 
both houses and the governor’s mansion, are increasingly passing strict 
voting laws.
14
 Many of these regulations have an underlying partisan tinge, 
 
 
 10. See, e.g., Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008).  
 11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend XV, § 2. 
 14. See Justin Levitt, Election Deform: The Pursuit of Unwarranted Electoral Regulation, 11 
ELECTION L.J. 97, 98 (2012) (noting that “the new spate of state regulations include several highly 
controversial laws that appear to exact real burdens on real Americans, making it more difficult for 
citizens to exercise their rights to vote”). For example, both Texas and North Carolina have recently 
passed new voting laws that are under legal challenge. See Aaron Blake, Justice Department Will 
Challenge Texas Voter ID Law, WASH. POST (Aug. 22, 2013, 12:47 PM), http://www.washingtonpost. 
com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/22/justice-department-will-challenge-texas-voter-id-law/, archived at 
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with Republicans supporting laws aimed at “voter integrity” and 
Democrats pushing laws intended to ease voter restrictions—both in an 
effort to help their parties’ electoral chances.15 Of course, the legislators 
usually do not justify the laws based on their partisan effects; they instead 
cite a generalized interest, such as “election integrity.” When courts defer 
to this governmental interest without careful scrutiny, these laws receive 
less meaningful judicial oversight. In turn, states will become even bolder 
in the kinds of election practices they promulgate. But election outcomes 
should not depend on partisan-laden voting rules. Partisan-based rules that 
dictate how our elections operate, and thus who wins, are dangerous for 
democracy, as they allow incumbents to entrench themselves in power and 
undermine the very foundation of our democratic system.
16
 To dissuade 
politically motivated voting laws, the Court should ratchet up the level of 
scrutiny for all voting regulations to ensure that Congress and state 
legislatures justify their election laws with actual, specific evidence of the 
purpose for the rule. 
This Article critically examines recent Supreme Court election law 
jurisprudence, with a particular eye toward cases involving state election 
administration—a hotbed of litigation at the Court in recent years. Election 
administration entails the rules of operating an election and encompasses 
laws such as voter identification requirements, regulation of primaries, and 
other “nuts-and-bolts” aspects of the voting process.17 The Article focuses 
primarily on the last decade, mainly because that is when states have 
increasingly enacted stricter election regulations,
18
 supposedly in the name 
of “election integrity,” but more likely to gain partisan advantage for the 
ruling party. In addition, during the first decade of the Roberts Court’s era, 
the Court’s jurisprudence, in various areas, has amplified the distinction 
 
 
http://perma.cc/6B7H-RZMJ; Charlie Savage, Justice Department Poised to File Lawsuit over Voter 
ID Law, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/30/us/politics/justice-
department-poised-to-file-lawsuit-over-voter-id-law-in-north-carolina.html; see also Nicholas Confessore, 
A National Strategy Funds State Political Monopolies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2014), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2014/01/12/us/politics/a-national-strategy-funds-state-political-monopolies.html (noting 
the rise in one-party control in the states and the corresponding partisan manipulation of voting rules).  
 15. See, e.g., Shelley de Alth, ID at the Polls: Assessing the Impact of Recent State Voter ID 
Laws on Voter Turnout, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 185, 189 (2009) (noting that voter ID laws tend to 
disadvantage Democratic voters more than Republican voters). 
 16. See Lori A. Ringhand, Voter Viewpoint Discrimination: A First Amendment Challenge to 
Voter Participation Restrictions, 13 ELECTION L.J. 288 (2014). 
 17. See Christopher S. Elmendorf, Structuring Judicial Review of Electoral Mechanics: 
Explanations and Opportunities, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 313, 315 (2007). 
 18. See Voting Laws Roundup 2013, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www. 
brennancenter.org/analysis/election-2013-voting-laws-roundup, archived at http://perma.cc/38BN-
9FTW. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/5
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between facial and as-applied challenges, so it is important to understand 
the practical effects of this procedural feature of election law cases.
19
  
Part I analyzes the Court’s failure to examine critically a state’s 
asserted interests in election administration cases, while at the same time 
questioning more carefully Congress’s reasoning for an election-related 
law. The analysis shows that the Court allows states to satisfy easily the 
governmental interest prong of the constitutional inquiry, while Congress 
receives greater scrutiny. Part II considers the Court’s contradictory 
discussion of facial and as-applied challenges, particularly in cases 
involving election administration. Both Parts reveal that the Court is using 
these judicial mechanisms to defer to states in how they run elections. Part 
III attempts to explain why the Court is taking this approach, situating the 
case law within the Roberts Court’s overall concept of federalism. It also 
highlights the influence of Chief Justice Roberts himself, showing that he 
has joined the majority in every single election law case of his tenure (so 
far) and has authored more majority opinions than any other Justice. Part 
IV explains why this deference to state election administration, 
accompanied by vigorous judicial scrutiny of federal election laws, is both 
incorrect and dangerous. It is wrong because the U.S. Constitution 
explicitly acknowledges an important and higher-level role for Congress in 
regulating an election; it is dangerous because it encourages states to enact 
partisan-based laws that, under current jurisprudence, will not receive 
meaningful judicial review. The Court is unwarranted in putting so much 
trust in the states. It should instead scrutinize more carefully a state’s rules 
involving election administration and require both states and Congress to 
articulate the specific justifications for a voting regulation. 
I. DEFERENCE TOWARD STATE INTERESTS IN ELECTION ADMINISTRATION 
The Court has deferred to state regulation of the voting process by 
crediting, at face value, a state’s asserted rationale for its laws. A state 
typically justifies its election rules by reference to generic platitudes such 
as “ensuring election integrity,”20 yet the Court rarely questions that 
 
 
 19. See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Facial and As-Applied Challenges Under the Roberts 
Court, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2009) (summarizing the Court’s facial and as-applied cases from 
2005–08 and discussing the implications of this jurisprudence).  
 20. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 191 (2008) (plurality 
opinion) (discussing “the State’s interest in protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral 
process”). 
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explanation. The Court has been more skeptical, however, of Congress’s 
justifications for passing an election statute.
21
 
Courts apply a familiar two-part test to constitutional challenges to an 
election regulation, whether under the First Amendment, Fourteenth 
Amendment, or another constitutional provision. First, does the 
government have a sufficiently important reason for adopting the rule in 
question (the interest prong)? Second, is the rule properly tailored to 
achieve the government’s goals (the tailoring prong)?22 The government’s 
obligation for the kind of justification it must provide under both the 
interest and tailoring prongs differs based on whether the Court applies 
strict scrutiny review or a lower balancing test, which in turn depends on 
the burdens the law imposes on voters.
23
 Laws that amount to severe 
burdens must pass strict scrutiny; laws that impose minor burdens must 
survive only a lower balancing test.
24
 Under either standard, the Court has 
generally deferred to a state’s rationale, particularly on the first prong. 
States usually lose only if the law is insufficiently tailored. The Court has 
not been as complaisant toward Congress on the interest inquiry. This Part 
considers how the Court has analyzed the interest prong for both state 
voting rules and congressional acts regulating elections. It shows that, 
unlike prior practice, recent case law has given wide leeway to states to 
administer elections without meaningful judicial oversight. 
A. Deferring to a State’s Interest in “Election Integrity” 
Today’s election administration cases present a shift in how the Court 
scrutinizes a state’s asserted interest in its laws regulating the election 
process. Currently, the Court generally accepts, at face value, a state’s 
proffered justification for its law, which is typically a generic statement 
about the need to protect the integrity of the election process.
25
 As one 
scholar notes, current jurisprudence “enables federal courts to selectively 
defer to a state’s interest in preventing election fraud without requiring a 
 
 
 21. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2625–31 (2013) (invalidating a portion of the 
Voting Rights Act).  
 22. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358–59 (1997) (explaining 
two-part test in the context of voting laws and First Amendment associational rights); Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983) (adopting test in which courts consider “the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule” and then evaluate “the extent 
to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights.”). 
 23. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–34 (1992). 
 24. See infra Part I.A. 
 25. See Crawford, 553 U.S. at 196. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/5
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more objective inquiry into whether states have a higher interest in 
addressing some kinds of election fraud than others.”26 
But in the 1960s—when election law first became a distinct field—the 
Court questioned more vigorously a state’s underlying rationale for its 
election rules, even when the state asserted something more specific that 
went beyond a broad interest in election integrity. For example, in 
Carrington v. Rash, the Court rejected Texas’s detailed justifications for 
denying voting rights to service members who recently moved to the 
state.
27
 Texas argued that it had a “legitimate interest in immunizing its 
elections from the concentrated balloting of military personnel” and “a 
valid interest in protecting the franchise from infiltration by transients.”28 
But the Court understood the state’s true desire as ensuring that an influx 
of military voters would not sway an election a particular way
29—an 
inherently results-based justification. The Court rejected this interest as 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
30
 That is, Texas did not have a 
legitimate interest in disallowing recently-moved members of the military 
from voting based on how they might vote.
31
 The Court refused to credit 
the state’s more generalized, sanguine justification of “protecting the 
franchise.” Similarly, in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, the Court 
invalidated the state’s poll tax, rejecting the state’s justifications for the 
law because the state did not have a sufficiently important interest in 
imposing a wealth requirement for voting.
32
 Thus, the state lost at the first 
prong of strict scrutiny: it could not justify the need for its law with a 
compelling interest.
33
  
The Court’s more deferential approach toward state election 
administration began in 1983 with a test first announced in Anderson v. 
Celebrezze, a challenge to Ohio’s ballot access rules for independent 
candidates.
34
 But even there, the Court closely examined the state’s 
 
 
 26. Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded? Highlighting an Inconsistent 
Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 31 (2009). 
 27. 380 U.S. 89, 93–95 (1965). 
 28. Id. at 93. 
 29. Id. at 93–94. 
 30. Id. at 94, 96–97. 
 31. Id. 
 32. 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).  
 33. Id. (“[T]he interest of the State, when it comes to voting, is limited to the power to fix 
qualifications. Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one’s ability to participate 
intelligently in the electoral process.”). 
 34. 460 U.S. 780 (1983). 
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asserted justifications for the law. The Court noted that when reviewing a 
state election regulation, a court 
must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted 
injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must 
identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State 
as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing 
judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and 
strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to 
which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s 
rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in 
a position to decide whether the challenged provision is 
unconstitutional.
35
 
Notably, when “identify[ing] and evaluat[ing] the precise interests put 
forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed,”36 the Court 
did not simply defer to the state’s general declaration of its desire to seek 
integrity in the election process.
37
 Instead, it carefully scrutinized the 
state’s more specific interests in “voter education,” “equal treatment” of 
all candidates, and “political stability,” going beyond the state’s broad 
justifications to determine the law’s actual intent.38 The state’s true interest 
in the more restrictive ballot access rules for independent candidates, the 
Court found, was not simply to foster “political stability” but instead 
represented an effort to protect the two main political parties from external 
competition from independent candidates.
39
 This justification, the Court 
ruled, was insufficient.
40
  
Similarly, the Court carefully considered Hawaii’s rationale behind its 
write-in ban in a 1992 case that further extrapolated the Anderson test.
41
 
The Court found the state’s specific interests satisfactory and upheld the 
law.
42
 It determined that, because the prohibition on write-in votes did not 
impose a severe burden on voters’ rights, the state did not need to assert a 
compelling interest.
 43
 Yet the Court still required a detailed explanation of 
 
 
 35. Id. at 789. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 796–806. 
 38. Id. at 796, 799, 801. 
 39. Id. at 801. 
 40. Id. at 805–06. 
 41. Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 439–40 (1992). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 438–39. 
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the state’s rationale for the write-in ban, thereby requiring the state to 
assess critically the purposes behind the law.
44
 The Court sustained the 
state’s goals of guarding against “‘the possibility of unrestrained 
factionalism at the general election’”45 and preventing “sore-loser 
candidacies,”46 which are more specific justifications than simply 
preserving the integrity of the election process. Because these 
particularized interests were legitimate and because the law was 
sufficiently tailored to achieve these goals, the Court upheld Hawaii’s rule. 
Thus, even when the Court carefully scrutinizes a state’s interest in an 
election regulation, a state can prevail. The state is simply put to a higher 
threshold to justify its rule. 
As recently as 2000, the Court flatly rejected an approach that accepted 
at face value a state’s generalized interest in fostering election fairness, 
even when the state provided more extensive justifications for its law.
47
 In 
a case about California’s “blanket” primary system, in which any voter 
could participate in any party’s primary for any race, the Court wrote, after 
dismissing the state’s first three justifications, that 
[the state’s] remaining four asserted state interests—promoting 
fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter 
participation, and protecting privacy—are not, like the others, 
automatically out of the running; but neither are they, in the 
circumstances of this case, compelling. That determination is not to 
be made in the abstract, by asking whether fairness, privacy, etc., 
are highly significant values; but rather by asking whether the 
aspect of fairness, privacy, etc., addressed by the law at issue is 
highly significant. And for all four of these asserted interests, we 
find it not to be.
48
 
That is, when the Court required a more specific explication of the state’s 
interests in an election practice, it correspondingly gave careful scrutiny to 
the state’s proffered reasons.  
Recently, however, the Court has taken a different approach, 
rubberstamping a more generalized state interest in “election integrity.”49 
By broadly conceptualizing a state’s interest in election administration, it 
 
 
 44. Id. at 439–40. 
 45. Id. at 439 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party, 479 U.S. 189, 196 (1986)). 
 46. Id. at 439–40. 
 47. Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 584 (2000). 
 48. Id. at 584. 
 49. See infra notes 54–73 and accompanying text. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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now more readily defers to states’ choices on how to run an election.50 As 
a result, a state now can justify an election practice by simply claiming, as 
a general matter, that it has an interest in election integrity or running a 
smooth election.
51
 Whether under strict scrutiny, in which it must 
demonstrate a compelling interest, or under a lower-level balancing test, in 
which it must show a sufficiently weighty interest, the state usually has no 
trouble meeting this threshold.
52
 The real question becomes whether the 
law is properly tailored to achieve that interest.
53
  
The fact that states now always meet this initial burden is highly 
significant for how the Court approaches these cases: a state is always 
credited with a valid rationale for its election rule. This demonstrates the 
high level of deference afforded to state election practices. As discussed 
below, this same level of deference typically does not attach to federal 
election laws. This approach epitomizes a theme running through the 
election law jurisprudence: tremendous trust in states to administer 
elections. 
 
 
 50. Not all lower courts have followed suit. For example, the Sixth Circuit, in ruling Ohio’s 
ballot access laws unconstitutional, explained that 
[t]he State has made no clear argument regarding the precise interests it feels are protected 
by the regulations at issue in the case, relying instead on generalized and hypothetical 
interests identified in other cases. Reliance on suppositions and speculative interests is not 
sufficient to justify a severe burden on First Amendment rights. 
Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Blackwell, 462 F.3d 579, 593 (6th Cir. 2006). The court also questioned 
the state’s asserted interest in “political stability,” stating that “[t]here is some question as to whether 
this rationale is even reasonable.” Id. at 594. But this kind of inquiry has been absent from more recent 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, and there is a danger that lower courts will follow the Court’s lead in 
future cases. 
 51. See Joshua A. Douglas, Is the Right to Vote Really Fundamental?, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 143, 188–91 (2008).  
 52. See infra notes 54–75 and accompanying text; see also Benson, supra note 26, at 18. State 
courts have followed the U.S. Supreme Court’s lead, declaring that a vague interest in preserving the 
“integrity of the election process” is a compelling interest even without any evidence that there are any 
election fraud problems. See, e.g., City of Memphis v. Hargett, 414 S.W.3d 88, 103 (Tenn. 2013). In 
fact, the Tennessee Supreme Court went even further, affirmatively declaring that the state need not 
have any evidence of election fraud before enacting a law in the name of election integrity. Id. at 104 
(stating that “protection of the integrity of the election process empowers the state to enact laws to 
prevent voter fraud before it occurs, rather than only allowing the state to remedy fraud after it has 
become a problem”). As discussed below, given the importance of the right to vote and the danger of 
partisan legislatures enacting partisan-based laws, this formulation places too high of a burden on 
plaintiffs. Instead, courts should require a state to justify its election regulations with particularized 
evidence of the harm the state is trying to avoid. Cf. Rickert v. State Pub. Disclosure Comm’n, 168 
P.3d 826, 830 (Wash. 2007) (questioning the “actual purpose” behind a law banning false campaign 
speech and failing to accept at face value the state’s interest in “preserving the integrity of the 
election”). 
 53. See Douglas, supra note 51, at 191 (noting that the “narrowly tailored prong provides the key 
to most election law disputes under strict scrutiny”). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/5
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Consider Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a 2008 case in 
which the Court upheld Indiana’s voter ID law.54 The Court identified 
three interests the state had invoked to justify its law: “deterring and 
detecting voter fraud,” “preventing voter fraud” based on Indiana’s flawed 
registration rolls, and “safeguarding voter confidence.”55 These are broad 
platitudes that amount to little more than an assertion of unfettered 
discretion to dictate how a state’s elections are run in the name of 
“election integrity.” After concluding, with very little discussion, that 
these interests were valid and “unquestionably relevant” to an ultimate 
interest in “protecting the integrity and reliability of the electoral process,” 
the Court moved on to consider whether the voter ID law actually 
achieved these interests.
56
 The Court failed to recognize that, given the 
lack of evidence of any actual fraud occurring in the state’s elections, 
Indiana’s law was really a solution in search of a problem.57 Moreover, the 
Court glossed over what surely was the actual reason behind the law: 
partisan motivations.
58
 Justice Stevens, in the Court’s plurality opinion, 
acknowledged that “[i]t is fair to infer that partisan considerations may 
have played a significant role in the decision to enact” the voter ID law, 
and that “[i]f such considerations had provided the only justification for a 
photo identification requirement, we may also assume that [the voter ID 
law] would suffer the same fate as the poll tax at issue in Harper.”59 But 
Justice Stevens then credited, in a conclusory fashion without explanation, 
the state’s vague “valid neutral justifications” for the law.60 Thus, without 
much discussion, the Court disregarded the Indiana legislature’s probable 
primary reason for the law: a desire for partisan gain for the majority 
party, which enacted the law on a party-line vote.
61
 A generic recitation of 
 
 
 54. 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 55. Id. at 191. 
 56. Id. 
 57. See Benson, supra note 26, at 18 (“Despite the scant evidence of this form of voter-initiated 
fraud, the Court deferred to the state’s decision and upheld the law as a justifiable burden on the right 
to vote.”). 
 58. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., 
dissenting) (“Let’s not beat around the bush: The Indiana voter photo ID law is a not-too-thinly-veiled 
attempt to discourage election-day turnout by certain folks believed to skew Democratic.”).  
 59. Crawford, 553 U.S. at 203. 
 60. Id. at 204. 
 61. See id. at 203; Dan Carden, Indiana Turnout Not Affected by Voter ID Requirement, NWI 
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2014 (“In 2005, the Republican-controlled General Assembly approved, on party 
lines, one of the nation’s first voter ID laws.”); see also Jamelle Bouie, Republicans Admit Voter-ID 
Laws Are Aimed at Democratic Voters, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast. 
com/articles/2013/08/28/republicans-admit-voter-id-laws-are-aimed-at-democratic-voters.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/628V-H9XR. 
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the state’s goal to ensure election integrity allowed the state to escape any 
meaningful scrutiny of its true rationale.
62
 
A similar failure to address the real underlying state interest also 
occurred in a 2008 case regarding New York’s primary process.63 A 
candidate for judicial office challenged New York’s law that required 
political parties to select their nominees for state supreme court justice (the 
state’s trial court) at a convention of delegates that the party members 
choose in a primary election.
64
 The candidate alleged that this system 
violated her First Amendment rights because it precluded any chance for 
“outsider” candidates that the leading political machine did not favor, as 
the party leaders had significant sway in the selection of delegates and 
thus the delegates’ choice of the nominee.65 In rejecting this argument, the 
Court’s majority deferred to the state’s ability to choose the candidate 
selection method it found most suitable.
66
 When a state gives a political 
party’s nominee placement on the general election ballot, the Court found, 
the state “acquires a legitimate governmental interest in ensuring the 
fairness of the party’s nominating process, enabling it to prescribe what 
that process must be.”67 Thus, in weighing the rights of a candidate to a 
“fair shot” at the nomination with a state’s role in administering the 
primary system, the Court simply deferred to the state’s choices. The 
Court credited the generic state interest in “ensuring the fairness of the 
party’s nominating process”68 without probing further into what actually 
motivated New York’s law: a desire to protect the ruling party 
machinery.
69
 That is, the Court failed to force the state to provide a 
specific reason for the law. Although the nominating process was a 
“classic patronage system”70 and the law was surely intended to entrench 
 
 
 62. As Professor Benson explains, deferral to a generic state interest in preventing election fraud 
has also led lower federal courts to uphold voter purges and other “voter-initiated fraud.” See Benson, 
supra note 26, at 18–20. Professor Benson argues that the Court has deferred to a state’s interest to 
prevent “voter-initiated” fraud but has not shown this same level of deference for “voter-targeted” 
fraud. Id. at 25. 
 63. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
 64. Id. at 198. 
 65. Id. at 204–05. 
 66. Id. at 203. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See Ellen D. Katz, Barack Obama, Margarita Lopez Torres, and the Path to Nomination, 8 
ELECTION L.J. 369, 379 (2009) (quoting Daniel Hays Lowenstein, Associational Rights of Major 
Political Parties: A Skeptical Inquiry, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1741, 1771 (1993)) (explaining that the 
decision “‘immunizes [party leaders] from the results of the give-and-take’ of the political process, and 
thereby favors ‘unaccountable and generally obscure party officials’”). 
 70. Id. at 380 (citing lower court opinion). 
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the party leaders,
71
 the Court neglected to conduct a thorough analysis of 
the real rationale behind the system, instead simply crediting the state’s 
broad justification of election integrity. 
One more example of the Court’s recent deferral to a state’s asserted 
interests for a voting rule will drive the point home. The Court in Doe v. 
Reed also neglected to consider meaningfully the state’s asserted rationale 
for a law requiring disclosure of petition signatures.
72
 The state claimed 
that it enacted the law to “preserv[e] the integrity of the electoral process 
by combating fraud, detecting invalid signatures, and fostering 
government transparency and accountability.”73 The Court simply found 
this state interest to be sufficient without much inquiry, noting in a 
conclusory fashion that “[t]he State’s interest in preserving the integrity of 
the electoral process is undoubtedly important.”74 By couching the state’s 
interest at such a high level of generality, it becomes impossible to 
question whether that interest is legitimate. Saying the state has an interest 
in election integrity begs the question, as no one would reasonably 
disagree that a state cannot seek to preserve the integrity of its election 
process. But there are almost always deeper reasons for an election law. 
Here, that interest might be to ensure that those who propose a ballot 
initiative cannot hide behind a shield of anonymity, as revealing the 
proponents tells the electorate something meaningful about the merits of 
the proposition. Or, more nefariously, the state might require disclosure to 
dissuade too many challenges to the status quo, as some individuals might 
be less likely to sign a petition if they know their names will be disclosed. 
The Court, however, failed to look beyond the generalized rationale of 
election integrity to examine the legislature’s likely true reason for 
enacting the election practice.
75
 
 
 
 71. See id. at 379. 
 72. Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010). 
 73. Id. at 197. 
 74. Id. 
 75. The only recent situation in which the Court has meaningfully scrutinized a state’s asserted 
interest in its election-related law is for a campaign finance regulation. In a case about Arizona’s 
public financing regime, the Court discredited Arizona’s proferred interest in avoiding actual or 
apparent corruption and instead claimed that the real (and impermissible) interest of the law was to 
equalize the playing field between candidates. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 
131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825–26 (2011). It thus did not take at face value the state’s more general argument 
regarding its justification for the law, instead probing deeper to consider the actual effect of the law 
and therefore the state’s corresponding interest in its promulgation. See also Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. 
v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012) (per curiam) (rejecting Montana’s independent expenditure ban 
based on Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010)). But see Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 261–
62 (2006) (plurality opinion) (crediting Vermont’s justification for its contribution limitation but 
invalidating the law under the tailoring prong). 
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This is not to suggest that federal courts will blindly affirm a state’s 
election rules; for instance, there were two important Sixth Circuit cases 
just before the 2012 election in which the court enjoined Ohio from 
enforcing election practices that the court deemed unconstitutional.
76
 
These Sixth Circuit panels properly put the state to a more rigorous test to 
justify these laws. Then again, many commentators suggested that the 
Supreme Court would have reversed these decisions had it agreed to hear 
them.
77
 Moreover, states still might lose on the tailoring prong.
78
 
Regardless, the relevant point is the jurisprudential trend: the Supreme 
Court has largely deferred to a state’s asserted interests in the first prong 
of the constitutional analysis. This is dangerous because it sends a signal 
to states that the Court will not scrutinize a new state voting regulation—
even if enacted with clear partisan intentions—so long as the state asserts 
a generic interest in “election integrity.” 
B. Scrutinizing Carefully Congress’s Justifications for an Election Rule 
The Court, in Shelby County v. Holder, was not as generous toward 
Congress’s rationale for its voting rule involving the preclearance 
mechanism of the Voting Rights Act, which required certain states to seek 
federal governmental approval before implementing any new voting 
regulations.
79
 Although just one case, Shelby County is extremely 
significant in part because it demonstrates the Court’s deep skepticism 
toward Congress’s asserted reasoning for its election laws.80 This 
interpretive methodology incorrectly disregards the constitutional 
authority delegated to Congress to oversee the election process.
81
 
 
 
 76. See Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (early voting); Ne. Ohio Coal. 
for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2012) (wrong precinct provisional balloting).  
 77. Edward B. Foley, The “Equitable” Aspect of the Sixth Circuit’s Early Voting Decision, 
ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ (Oct. 7, 2012, 4:20 PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/ 
?article=9823, archived at http://perma.cc/7LK-VJ4M; Rick Hasen, “The Soundness of the Equal 
Protection Holding in the Ohio Early Voting Decision”, ELECTION LAW BLOG (Oct. 8, 2012, 12:01 
PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=41281, archived at http://perma.cc/52QM-VLEE. But see Joshua 
A. Douglas, The Soundness of the Equal Protection Holding in the Ohio Early Voting Decision, 
ELECTION LAW AT MORITZ (Oct. 8, 2012, 10:44 AM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-law/article/ 
?article=9825, archived at http://perma.cc/3RDS-PQNA. 
 78. See, e.g., Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 432. 
 79. 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 80. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, State’s Rights, Last Rites, and Voting 
Rights, 47 CONN. L. REV. 481, 509 (“[F]rom its inception, the Court has understood the [Voting Rights 
Act] precisely [as a superstatute] and has willingly cooperated with Congress, as the people’s 
representatives, in fulfilling the Act’s considerable promise.”). 
 81. Id. at 507–08. 
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Moreover, it is contrary to historical practice, in which the Court had 
previously recognized Congress’s primacy in regulating elections.82 
Rejecting Congress’s asserted rationale for reauthorizing the 
preclearance formula in 2006 pervades Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis for 
the majority in Shelby County. Although Chief Justice Roberts did not 
identify the constitutional test he was employing in his opinion,
83
 it 
appears he would have rejected Congress’s justifications even under 
rational basis review. He stated that “Congress did not use the record it 
compiled to shape a coverage formula grounded in current conditions,” 
which is another way of saying that Congress did not have even a 
reasonable basis for passing the law.
84
 Instead of deferring to Congress’s 
reliance on the lengthy legislative record—a common feature of rational 
basis review
85—he faulted Congress for failing to explain why it targeted 
some states but not others when maintaining the coverage formula in 
reauthorizing the Voting Rights Act.
86
 This is quite different from 
deferring to legislative judgment on election rules. As Justice Ginsburg 
wrote in her dissent,  
It is well established that Congress’ judgment regarding exercise of 
its power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments 
warrants substantial deference . . . . When confronting the most 
constitutionally invidious form of discrimination, and the most 
fundamental right in our democratic system, Congress’ power to act 
is at its height.
87
  
 
 
 82. See Richard M. Valelly, The Reed Rules and Republican Party Building: A New Look, 23 
STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 115, 123–25 (2009) (citing Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1879), Ex parte 
Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879), and Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884) as a means of explaining 
how historically “a unanimous Court ruled that in order to protect the electoral processes that made it a 
national representative assembly, Congress could protect the right to vote of any citizen, black or 
white”). 
 83. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2627–31. 
 84. Id. at 2629. For a further discussion of the ways in which the Court can reject congressional 
justifications for a law, see Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 
80, 83 (2001) (noting that “the Court has undermined Congress’s ability to decide for itself how and 
whether to create a record in support of pending legislation”); see also id. at 104–05 (discussing the 
Court’s rejection of Congress’s legislative record in supporting a law). 
 85. See, e.g., Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 276 (1981) 
(“The court must defer to a congressional finding that a regulated activity affects interstate commerce, 
if there is any rational basis for such a finding.”).  
 86. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2630–31 (“It would have been irrational for Congress to 
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on 40-year-old data, when today’s 
statistics tell an entirely different story.”).  
 87. Id. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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The majority, however, rejected this conception, elevating its own view of 
what Congress intended over explicit congressional statements regarding 
its justifications.
88
 As Professors Guy-Uriel Charles and Luis Fuentes-
Rohwer state, “In Shelby County, the Court declared that the era of 
deference [to Congress] was over.”89 
Of course, regardless of the outcome in Shelby County, the main 
problem this Article identifies still exists: the Court too readily defers to 
state interests when faced with a constitutional challenge to a state election 
regulation. Shelby County compounds the problem, demonstrating that the 
Court will not give the same deference to congressional enactments on 
voting rights. The combination of these approaches shifts the balance of 
power to the states to regulate the election process. 
Shelby County represents the only constitutional challenge to a federal 
voting rule in recent years, yet the Court’s lack of deference to Congress 
pervades the analysis for other kinds of election laws as well. For instance, 
the Court has been extremely skeptical of federal campaign finance 
regulations. In Citizens United, which involved federal limitations on 
corporate and union spending on elections, the Court discounted the 
federal government’s asserted justification of preventing corruption or the 
appearance of corruption through increased donor access to legislators.
90
 
Minimizing the significance of the government’s asserted interest, the 
Court found that “[i]ngratiation and access, in any event, are not 
corruption.”91 Thus, the Court rejected Congress’s explicit rationale for the 
law, finding that it failed to meet the interest prong of the constitutional 
analysis.
92
 Similarly, in another case, the Court flatly rejected Congress’s 
justification for differing contribution limits for wealthy and non-wealthy 
candidates, finding that the government could not support the law under 
the interest prong.
93
 Congress passed the law to equalize electoral 
opportunities for candidates of different wealth, but the Court stated that 
the only permissible justification for a campaign finance regulation is to 
prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption.
94
 Unlike the Court’s 
approach to state voting rules, this analysis of federal election laws limits 
 
 
 88. Id. at 2629 (maj. op.). 
 89. Charles & Fuentes-Rowher, supra note 80, at 512. 
 90. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 359–60 (2010). 
 91. Id. at 360. 
 92. Id. at 360–61. In addition, the Court held that Congress’s remedy in limiting corporate and 
union campaign speech was unconstitutional, meaning that the tailoring prong was also important to 
the Court’s holding. Id. at 340. 
 93. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 738–40 (2008). 
 94. Id. at 740–42. 
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the available justifications Congress can rely upon to legislate in this area. 
Broad platitudes about preserving election integrity are insufficient.
95
 
In sum, the Court has been much more meticulous in examining 
Congress’s interests in its election regulations as compared to how it treats 
states. The Court has not said explicitly that it defers more readily to states 
to regulate elections. But the underlying message is that states have a 
lower burden to justify their election administration and simply must cite a 
generalized notion of election integrity to pass the first prong of the 
constitutional inquiry.
96
 
II. FACIAL VERSUS AS-APPLIED CHALLENGES TO ELECTION LAWS 
The Court has largely deferred to states, but not Congress, by 
distinguishing between facial and as-applied challenges in election 
litigation, a procedural difference that alters the scope of the Court’s 
opinions. Recent case law has demonstrated that the Court strongly 
 
 
 95. See id. The only election-related statutes in which the Court has deferred more broadly to the 
government’s asserted interests are disclosure and disclaimer laws regarding campaign finance; the 
Court has said that the government has a very low burden to justify these provisions. See, e.g., Citizens 
United, 558 U.S. at 366–67. 
 96. Besides emergency appeals, which typically present procedural issues, only one other federal 
election administration case has reached the Supreme Court on the merits during Roberts’s term, but it 
was not a constitutional challenge. Yet the decision still had the effect of elevating the role of states in 
regulating the election process.  
 In a case involving federal preemption of a state’s voter registration requirements, the Court 
embellished a state’s authority in determining voter qualifications. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of 
Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2251 (2013). The case actually represented a win for the federal government, as 
the Court held that the National Voter Registration Act preempted Arizona’s contrary law. But the 
underlying message was that Congress has no role to play in determining the contours of the 
electorate. The Court explained that, under the U.S. Constitution, states—not Congress—have wide 
leeway to determine voter qualifications, seeming to place particular emphasis on this facet of 
constitutional allocation of power. Id. at 2253–54. The ultimate significance of the decision therefore 
may be opposite from what the actual holding reflects, as states will be able to use the reasoning in the 
majority’s opinion to defend their election regulations, at least regarding voter qualification 
requirements.  
 For a slightly different view of the import of the Court’s opinion in Arizona v. Inter Tribal 
Council, see Samuel Issacharoff, Beyond the Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95, 
112–13 (2013) (arguing that “there is untested room for expansion of congressional intervention under 
the Elections Clause”). I do not disagree with Professor Issacharoff that, as a matter of constitutional 
interpretation, the Elections Clause provides broad authority to Congress to regulate the electoral 
process. See infra Part IV.A. I am just not as optimistic, given the language regarding Congress’s 
inability to regulate issues of voter eligibility, that this interpretation is the best reading of Justice 
Scalia’s majoirty opinion in Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council. Instead, this portion of the opinion 
elevates the role of states in determining voter qualifications, at the expense of Congress. See Inter 
Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2258 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Prescribing voting 
qualifications, therefore, forms no part of the power to be conferred upon the national government by 
the Elections Clause, which is expressly restricted to the regulation of the times, the places, and the 
manner of elections.”).  
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disapproves of facial challenges to state laws involving voting rules, yet it 
has sustained at least two significant facial challenges to federal laws.
97
 In 
a facial challenge, the plaintiff asserts that the law is invalid in every 
application, irrespective of how the law might operate for that plaintiff.
98
 
The plaintiff wins only if he or she can “establish that no set of 
circumstances exists under which the [law] would be valid.”99 An as-
applied challenge, by contrast, is narrower, as the plaintiff claims only that 
the law is invalid with respect to that particular plaintiff.
100
 The claim is 
thus more dependent on the facts and evidence regarding that specific 
plaintiff, as it asks whether the law operates unconstitutionally for that 
plaintiff and those similarly situated.
101
 
In many of these cases, the Court has provided specific guidance on the 
propriety of bringing facial or as-applied challenges to election 
regulations. But the Court has vacillated, sometimes rejecting facial 
challenges and other times sustaining them.
102
 When the Court has 
determined that facial challenges are inappropriate and that only as-
applied challenges are allowed, it has rejected the plaintiff’s claim and 
upheld the law, at least until the plaintiff can provide specific evidence on 
how the law unconstitutionally impacted that particular individual. This 
has been the general approach to reviewing state laws involving election 
administration. When the Court has allowed facial challenges, by contrast, 
it has struck down the laws under review, for both federal election 
administration laws and all campaign finance laws. But the Court has 
failed to provide a meaningful doctrinal justification for why it prefers one 
approach over the other.
103
 This procedural distinction has a practical 
consequence: by rejecting facial challenges to state election administration 
 
 
 97. The Court’s delineation between facial and as-applied challenges is not limited to the election 
setting. For example, recent abortion cases have included lengthy discussions of the distinction. See, 
e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 167–68 (2007); Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New 
England, 546 U.S. 320, 329–31 (2006); see also Metzger, supra note 19, at 776–83.  
 98. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 639; see also Michael C. Dorf, Facial Challenges to State and 
Federal Statutes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 235, 236 (1994). 
 99. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987). 
 100. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 639; Dorf, supra note 98, at 236. 
 101. Professor Richard Fallon has suggested that the distinction between facial and as-applied 
challenges is not as meaningful as the Court has suggested. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact 
and Fiction About Facial Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011) (examining six Court terms to 
uncover “facts” and “fictions” about the Court’s approach to facial challenges). Because the Court 
continues to rely on the distinction, however, it is important to understand its effects. 
 102. Id. at 919 (“[C]ontrary to the conventional wisdom, the Supreme Court does not routinely 
insist on ruling on as-applied challenges before deciding whether to hold a statute invalid on its face, 
nor should it almost always do so.”). 
 103. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 774–75 (summarizing the Roberts Court’s varied approach 
and noting the Court’s “strategic use of the facial versus as-applied distinction”). 
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laws, the Court implicitly sanctions the state’s practice. That is, the 
Court’s approach provides a procedural mechanism for allowing states to 
regulate elections while scrutinizing Congress more closely.  
A. Facial Challenges to Rules Regulating Election Administration 
This section examines the Court’s approach to facial and as-applied 
challenges for both state election rules and congressional enactments 
regarding election administration. The analysis reveals that the Court 
allows only as-applied challenges to state voting laws but will sustain a 
facial challenge to a congressional statute—meaning that state voting rules 
stay in place and are subject only to piecemeal litigation involving 
particular circumstances, while the federal law is struck down in its 
entirety. The Court is using the procedural distinction between facial and 
as-applied challenges to allow states to continue enforcing their election 
regulations while imposing greater judicial scrutiny on federal laws. 
1. Rejecting Facial Challenges to State Laws Involving Election 
Administration 
The primary explication of the differences between facial and as-
applied challenges in election law cases occurred in Washington State 
Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, a 2008 ruling with little 
salience and minimial significance in terms of its substantive holding.
104
 
The Court upheld Washington’s “top-two” primary law, in which 
candidates run in a “blanket” primary open to all voters and the top two 
vote recipients move on to the general election.
105
 The law allows 
candidates to state their political party preference on the ballot, even if the 
party did not endorse the candidate.
106
 The Court rejected the political 
parties’ arguments that this system violates their associational rights, in 
part because they brought only a facial challenge. The majority opinion, 
written by Justice Thomas, explained that the political parties challenged 
 
 
 104. 552 U.S. 442 (2008). There were prior campaign finance cases that presented the distinction 
between facial and as-applied challenges, but Washington State Grange entails the Court’s first major 
discussion of the difference in the election administration setting. See, e.g., Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. 
FEC, 546 U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam).  
 105. Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 444–45. 
 106. Id. at 447. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
572 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 92:553 
 
 
 
 
the law “not in the context of an actual election,”107 meaning that they had 
a heavy burden:
 
 
 Facial challenges are disfavored for several reasons. Claims of 
facial invalidity often rest on speculation. As a consequence, they 
raise the risk of premature interpretation of statutes on the basis of 
factually barebones records. Facial challenges also run contrary to 
the fundamental principle of judicial restraint that courts should 
neither anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the 
necessity of deciding it nor formulate a rule of constitutional law 
broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied. Finally, facial challenges threaten to short circuit the 
democratic process by preventing laws embodying the will of the 
people from being implemented in a manner consistent with the 
Constitution. We must keep in mind that [a] ruling of 
unconstitutionality frustrates the intent of the elected representatives 
of the people.
108
 
In the context of the top-two primary law, the Court determined that the 
political parties’ argument regarding voter confusion about the party’s 
endorsement of a candidate rested on “sheer speculation.”109 The Court 
explained that it could not strike down an election law on its face merely 
because there was a possibility of voter confusion
110
: the plaintiffs would 
have to show actual evidence of confusion in an as-applied challenge. 
Because the Court could conceive of a ballot designation of political party 
preference that would not confuse voters, it rejected the plaintiffs’ facial 
argument.
111
 The “factual determination” of whether there actually would 
be voter confusion “must await an as-applied challenge.”112 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, concurred, stating that 
“because respondents brought this challenge before the State of 
Washington had printed ballots for use under the new primary regime, we 
have no idea what those ballots will look like.”113 He therefore wanted to 
see the ballots before he could determine if they would confuse voters 
about whether the party was endorsing a candidate.
114
 That is, he bolstered 
 
 
 107. Id. at 449–50. 
 108. Id. at 450–51 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in the original). 
 109. Id. at 454. 
 110. Id. at 455. 
 111. Id. at 456. 
 112. Id. at 458. 
 113. Id. at 460 (Roberts, C.J., concurring). 
 114. Id. at 462. 
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the notion that only an as-applied challenge to a specific ballot design was 
appropriate.
115
 
The upshot of Washington State Grange is that a plaintiff may not 
challenge a newly-enacted state election regulation on its face. Instead, the 
plaintiff must wait until the state implements the law and then gather 
evidence on the law’s impact, potentially having to endure at least one 
election cycle under the law to obtain that information.
116
 The plaintiff 
may then bring a narrower, as-applied challenge to the specific manner in 
which the law operates. This allows the law to stay in force, meaning that 
the Court is deferring to state election processes until the plaintiff can 
show that the state’s implementation of the law during an actual election is 
constitutionally suspect. 
The Court used the precedent from Washington State Grange a few 
weeks later in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board, a much more 
salient and controversial decision regarding Indiana’s new voter 
identification law.
117
 At the time, Indiana had one of the strictest voter ID 
laws in the country.
118
 Nevertheless, the plurality ruled that the plaintiffs 
had failed to provide enough evidence of the burdens the law imposed in 
this facial challenge.
119
 Under the plaintiff’s facial assault, the Court was 
required to consider the application of the voter ID law to all voters in the 
abstract, outside of the context of a real election. There was insufficient 
evidence, according to the plurality, of the burdens on specific groups of 
individuals who would suffer greater barriers to vote because of the law, 
such as indigent voters or those who have religious objections to being 
photographed.
120
 The Court thus deferred to the state’s asserted need for a 
voter ID requirement unless and until the plaintiffs could generate real 
evidence, from an actual election, of how the law impermissibly denied 
the right to vote.
121
 
 
 
 115. See id. Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, dissented, arguing that there was no ballot 
the state could design under the law that would not confuse voters regarding a political party’s 
endorsement of a candidate. He therefore would have struck down the law on its face. See id. at 462 
(Scalia, J., dissenting).  
 116. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 681. 
 117. 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion). 
 118. Id. at 222 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 200 (plurality opinion) (“[O]n the basis of the evidence in the record it is not possible to 
quantify either the magnitude of the burden on this narrow class of voters or the portion of the burden 
imposed on them that is fully justified.”). Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy. 
 120. Id. at 199. 
 121. Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, concurred in the judgment, stating that 
he would not leave the door open to as-applied challenges and instead would uphold the voter ID law 
on its face. See id. at 209 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Souter (joined by Justice Ginsburg) and 
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Because of the Court’s decision, a law might disenfranchise some 
voters for at least one election cycle due to their inability to obtain a valid 
ID. A determination of whether this is unlawful, however, would have to 
wait for an as-applied challenge in which the plaintiff-voters submit 
specific evidence of the burdens they suffered during the election. In 
essence, the plaintiffs would have to gather evidence of how the law 
unconstitutionally took away their right to vote in the initial election so 
they could use that evidence in a subsequent as-applied challenge. The 
problem, of course, is that in the meantime the voters already suffered a 
potential infringement of their right to vote. In the process, states are given 
wide leeway to impose voting regulations, such as a photo identification 
requirement, in at least one election. The Court thus used the procedural 
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges to defer to state 
processes for running an election. 
Given the discussion in both Washington State Grange and Crawford, 
as well as the Roberts Court’s application of the facial versus as-applied 
approach in other contexts,
122
 one would expect the Court to continue to 
reject facial challenges to election regulations, waiting for appropriate 
evidence of the particularized burdens a law imposes in an as-applied 
lawsuit. As Professor Gillian Metzger noted in a 2009 article, “[o]ne 
recurring theme of the Roberts Court’s jurisprudence to date is its 
resistance to facial constitutional challenges and preference for as-applied 
litigation.”123 Scholars, including me, lamented this shift in allowing only 
as-applied litigation to challenge an election regulation.
124
 This judicial 
framework meant that plaintiffs would likely have to suffer burdens, 
including possible disenfranchisement, for at least one election cycle so 
they could gather the necessary evidence to mount a successful as-applied 
challenge, making constitutional election litigation proceed in piecemeal 
fashion.
125
 This is not to suggest that states will necessarily win every 
lawsuit, even in the lower courts, or that courts will refuse to issue 
 
 
Justice Breyer each wrote dissents. See id. at 209 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 237 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 122. See supra note 103. 
 123. Metzger, supra note 19, at 773. 
 124. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 677; Nathaniel Persily & Jennifer S. Rosenberg, Defacing 
Democracy?: The Changing Nature and Rising Importance of As-Applied Challenges in the Supreme 
Court’s Recent Election Law Decisions, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1644 (2009); Cf. Metzger, supra note 19, at 
786–88 (suggesting that the consequence of the distinction rests on how broadly or narrowly the Court 
defines an as-applied challenge). 
 125. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 681.  
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preliminary injunctions before an election in the right circumstances.
126
 
But it does present a limiting principle for plaintiffs (as-applied 
challenges) and a litigation strategy to avoid (facial challenges).
127
  
Despite these two cases, however, the Court has shifted its approach 
dramatically in subsequent election law disputes, invalidating some 
election laws on their face. Interestingly, as the next section reveals, the 
difference seems to turn on whether the case involves a federal or state 
election law. 
2. Embracing a Facial Challenge to a Federal Law Involving Election 
Administration 
Unlike its recent approach to state election administration rules, the 
Court welcomed a facial challenge to the federal Voting Rights Act, 
striking down a portion of the law. In Shelby County v. Holder,
128
 
plaintiffs challenged one of Congress’s most controversial election 
administration rules: Sections 4 and 5 of the Voting Rights Act.
129
 These 
provisions, which Congress reauthorized in 2006, required certain 
“covered jurisdictions” to obtain preclearance, or preapproval, before 
making any changes to their voting processes.
130
 Shelby County, Alabama, 
a covered jurisdiction, challenged the entire formulation of the law (i.e., on 
its face), as opposed to bringing a narrower as-applied attack to its own 
 
 
 126. See, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2012) (invalidating Ohio’s 
cutback of early voting to all but military voters because it was not sufficiently tailored to the state’s 
interest in smooth election administration). 
 127. The Court has also directly obscured the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges 
while still ruling in favor of a state’s process. In Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010), the Court upheld a 
Washington law requiring disclosure of the names of individuals who had signed petitions to put a gay 
marriage amendment on the ballot by rejecting the plaintiff’s lawsuit irrespective of whether it was 
couched as a facial or as-applied challenge. The case had  
characteristics of both: The claim is “as applied” in the sense that it does not seek to strike the 
[law] in all its applications, but only to the extent it covers referendum petitions. The claim is 
“facial” in that it is not limited to plaintiffs’ particular case, but challenges application of the 
law more broadly to all referendum petitions.  
Id. at 194. The deciding factor was that the state had an important interest in “preserving the integrity 
of the electoral process.” Id. at 197. In this circumstance, then, it was not the rejection of a facial 
challenge but instead overall deference to the state’s generalized interest in election integrity that 
drove the Court’s affirmation of the state’s election practice. See supra Part I.A; see also Fallon, supra 
note 101, at 971 n.335 (construing Doe v. Reed as an as-applied challenge). 
 128. 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 129. See Fannie Lou Hamer, Rosa Parks, and Coretta Scott King Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization and Amendments Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-246. 
 130. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2619–20. 
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inclusion based on evidence of whether it should be subject to 
preclearance.
131
 
Contrary to the approach one might expect from a Court that had 
permitted plaintiffs to bring only as-applied challenges, the majority did 
not require Shelby County to demonstrate why it was inappropriate to 
include it within the Act’s coverage. That is, Shelby County was not 
forced to present evidence regarding its own burdens under the law, as 
would be necessary in an as-applied suit. Instead, the majority agreed with 
Shelby County’s more general facial attack.132 But the majority 
surprisingly failed to explain why it was sanctioning a broad-based facial 
assault to the law. The entirety of the Court’s reasoning regarding the 
appropriateness of the facial challenge amounted to a single, unhelpful 
analogy: 
The dissent also turns to the record to argue that, in light of voting 
discrimination in Shelby County, the county cannot complain about 
the provisions that subject it to preclearance. But that is like saying 
that a driver pulled over pursuant to a policy of stopping all 
redheads cannot complain about that policy, if it turns out his 
license has expired. Shelby County’s claim is that the coverage 
formula here is unconstitutional in all its applications, because of 
how it selects the jurisdictions subjected to preclearance. The 
county was selected based on that formula, and may challenge it in 
court.
133
 
The situations, however, are not really analogous: Shelby County is not 
objecting to one policy even though it engaged in some other unrelated 
and unlawful act. Instead, it is challenging its own inclusion as a covered 
jurisdiction—the very thing for which it was, under Roberts’s analogy, 
“pulled over.” That is, Shelby County should not be able to challenge the 
consequences of Congress including others for preclearance if it would be 
appropriate, given the evidence of Shelby County’s own history regarding 
discrimination in election administration, to have congressional oversight 
over its voting changes. The analogy thus begs the question of whether 
Shelby County could have succeeded in a narrower challenge to its own 
inclusion, irrespective of whether this particular coverage formula was too 
broad. If Shelby County’s history is such that it should be subject to the 
preclearance requirement, then it is irrelevant whether the coverage 
 
 
 131. Id. at 2621–22. 
 132. Id. at 2625. 
 133. Id. at 2629–30 (citation omitted). 
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formula that places Shelby County under Section 5 of the Act might be 
flawed as to other jurisdictions. In an as-applied challenge, Shelby County 
would have had to question Congress’s evidence for creating a coverage 
formula that included Shelby County itself, regardless of how the formula 
applied elsewhere. Put differently, the remedy could be to exclude Shelby 
County without needing to pass upon whether the entire coverage formula 
was invalid. 
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg focused on this aspect of the majority’s 
reasoning, noting that the majority failed to exercise its “usual restraint” in 
choosing not to address facial challenges.
134
 Under normal rules of 
constitutional adjudication, “‘a person to whom a statute may 
constitutionally be applied will not be heard to challenge that statute on 
the ground that it may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others, 
in other situations not before the Court.’”135 Shelby County had failed to 
demonstrate why it should not fall under the coverage formula, even if that 
formula had incorrectly captured other jurisdictions:  
the Court’s opinion in this case contains not a word explaining why 
Congress lacks the power to subject to preclearance the particular 
plaintiff that initiated this lawsuit—Shelby County, Alabama. The 
reason for the Court’s silence is apparent, for as applied to Shelby 
County, the VRA’s preclearance requirement is hardly 
contestable.
136
  
Justice Ginsburg concluded that by “[l]eaping to resolve Shelby County’s 
facial challenge without considering whether application of the VRA to 
Shelby County is constitutional, . . . the Court’s opinion can hardly be 
described as an exemplar of restrained and moderate decisionmaking.”137 
Unlike in previous cases, the majority in Shelby County provided very 
little reasoning for its interpretive methodology, as it merely cited the 
burdens that the law imposed on certain states and not others. Moreover, 
the Court’s approach to the facial versus as-applied aspect of the case was 
completely at odds with the analysis from Washington State Grange and 
Crawford, in which the Court rejected facial challenges to state laws 
because it preferred narrower, as-applied litigation. Yet the Court did not 
cite either case in Shelby County. Thus, the decision, although a sample of 
one, represents a shift in how the Court construes challenges involving 
 
 
 134. Id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 135. Id. at 2645 (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610 (1973)). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. at 2648. 
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election administration laws. The decision was broad because it struck 
down all aspects of the coverage formula without addressing whether 
Shelby County itself was a proper target of preclearance.
138
  
This is not to say, of course, that the difference between facial and as-
applied challenges motivated the Court’s decision in Shelby County. But it 
is certainly inconsistent with the Court’s prior approach regarding the 
proper constitutional mode of scrutiny for cases involving election 
administration. Taking Congress out of the election administration 
business—the practical effect of this jurisprudence—provides a 
reconciling principle.  
Moreover, although Shelby County is the only recent election case 
considering the constitutionality of a federal election administration law 
on the merits, it still represents a significant shift in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.
139
 To be consistent with Washington State Grange and 
Crawford, the Court should have rejected the plaintiff’s facial challenge. 
The Court’s recent election law jurisprudence thus reveals that it will 
welcome facial challenges to federal election rules but reject facial 
challenges to state voting laws.
140
 
 
 
 138. In some ways, the decision was perhaps narrower than it could have been, as the Court issued 
no ruling on Section 5 itself. It limited its analysis to the coverage formula in Section 4. Id. at 2631. 
But the Court surely knew that by invalidating Section 4 it was effectively gutting Section 5 as well. 
See John Paul Stevens, The Court & the Right to Vote: A Dissent, N.Y. REVIEW OF BOOKS (Aug. 15, 
2013), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2013/aug/15/the-court-right-to-vote-dissent/ ?pagination 
=false, archived at http://perma.cc/BD82-NYJY (reviewing GARY MAY, BENDING TOWARD JUSTICE: 
THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2013)) 
(highlighting the “unusual feature” of the majority’s reasoning: “Instead of holding that it was 
unconstitutional to apply the preclearance requirement to Shelby County, the Court merely held that it 
was unconstitutional to use the formula in the 1965 Act to identify those jurisdictions that must have 
their proposed voting changes precleared. Presumably that narrower holding was intended to avoid the 
rule of judicial restraint that normally, in a so-called facial challenge, required the plaintiffs 
challenging the constitutionality of a federal statute to convince the Court that the statute is invalid 
under all circumstances.”); see, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Invalidates Key Part of Voting 
Rights Act, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/26/us/supreme-court-
ruling.html. 
 139. The other main congressional statutes that regulate the administration of elections are the 
Help America Vote Act of 2002, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2014), the National Voter Registration 
Act of 1993, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–20511 (2014), the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee 
Voting Act (UOCAVA), 52 U.S.C. §§ 20301–20311 (2014), and the Military and Overseas Voter 
Empowerment Act (MOVE), id. The Supreme Court has not heard a constitutional challenge to any of 
these statutes, and the Court has cited these laws only fleetingly. For a brief discussion of the few 
lower court decisions involving UOCAVA and the MOVE Act, see Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights 
and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement of Federal Election Laws, 44 IND. L. REV. 113, 144 
(2010). 
 140. The Court has also discussed the facial versus as-applied distinction in the campaign finance 
context, most notably in Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). There, the majority rejected the 
plaintiffs’ asserted as-applied challenges and invalidated the federal provision on its face. This might 
reveal overall skepticism of federal election regulation, or heightened scrutiny of campaign finance 
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The Court has been extremely inconsistent on whether facial or as-
applied litigation is more appropriate to challenge election regulations. 
Perhaps the Court was simply being results-oriented: the majority of 
Justices wanted to uphold Washington’s top-two system and Indiana’s 
voter ID law, but sought to invalidate the preclearance formula of the 
Voting Rights Act, and thus chose the procedural device for each case that 
would achieve those results.
141
 Indeed, the merits of the substantive 
constitutional law on each issue might explain the differing approaches.
142
 
Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated that judicial decision making 
often has a partisan bent.
143
 But that explanation is fairly simplistic, and it 
may not capture the full picture. That is, focusing on the results obscures 
the underlying doctrinal shift in the Court’s election law jurisprudence. 
Instead, a closer look at the analysis reveals that the Court is using the 
facial versus as-applied distinction to reach the broader constitutional 
question for federal statutes but not for state voting rules. Allowing facial 
challenges leads to the invalidation of federal election laws, while 
requiring only as-applied litigation results in the Court upholding state 
voting statutes. This procedural difference, combined with the findings of 
the previous Part—which showed that the Court rarely scrutinizes a state’s 
rationale for an election administration law but at the same time looks 
more skeptically at the reasoning behind a congressional enactment—
makes the trend of the Court’s recent election law jurisprudence evident: it 
trusts the states, but not Congress, to run elections.  
 
 
laws in general. Cf. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion) (invalidating Vermont 
contribution limitation); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 
(2011) (striking down Arizona public financing scheme). In some ways, campaign finance is its own 
category of First Amendment law that is separate from election administration. Nevertheless, the 
decision to sustain facial challenges to campaign finance rules makes the Court’s deference toward 
state election administration and the rejection of facial challenges to state voting laws even starker. 
 141. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 797 (suggesting the Court may use the facial and as-applied 
distinction for “strategic ends” and that “these decisions may be result-driven”); Kreit, supra note 9, at 
663 (arguing that the “doctrine [of facial and as-applied challenges] reveals itself as little more than a 
rhetorical device that Justices use to add support for decisions they would have reached without it”). 
 142. See Metzger, supra note 19, at 799–801 (arguing that “it is substantive constitutional law that 
determines not just the availability of facial challenges, but in addition the extent to which as-applied 
challenges represent a meaningful mechanism for asserting constitutional rights”). 
 143. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 19–25 (2008) (determining that a judge’s partisanship based on the party of the appointing 
president influences decision making in lower court cases involving the Voting Rights Act); see also 
Joshua A. Douglas, The Voting Rights Act Through the Justices’ Eyes: NAMUDNO and Beyond, 88 
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 1, 8 (2009) (asserting that conservative Supreme Court Justices tend to 
construe the Voting Rights Act narrowly while liberal justices interpret the Act broadly). 
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III. ELECTION LAW, FEDERALISM, AND CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS 
This Part suggests some reasons why the Court has largely deferred, 
both substantively and procedurally, to states to administer elections. The 
explanation has two components. First, the cases fit within the Roberts 
Court’s overall ideals of federalism. Second, Chief Justice Roberts himself 
has been in the majority in every election-related case during his tenure, 
demonstrating his own significance in shaping this field and suggesting 
that ideological motivations regarding the federal-state balance of power 
may be behind the Court’s decisions. 
A. Election Law and the Roberts Court’s Federalism 
Federalism may explain, at least in part, why the Court recently has 
been so deferential to state election administration. In fact, federalism, 
although not explicitly addressed in detail, infuses much of the Roberts 
Court’s jurisprudence.144 The election law decisions fit within this 
framework.  
Although the Roberts Court has not made many specific 
pronouncements about federalism per se, it has sent clear signals of its 
intent to limit congressional power in favor of the states. For example, in 
Bond v. United States, a case about whether a federal defendant had 
standing to challenge the constitutionality of the law under which she was 
convicted, the Court went out of its way to elevate federalism principles.
145
 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion, which Chief Justice Roberts joined, 
“virtually basks” in federalism doctrine.146 Justice Kennedy explained his 
view that “[f]ederalism secures the freedom of the individual.”147 Invoking 
obliquely a concern about elections, Justice Kennedy asserted that 
federalism “enables greater citizen ‘involvement in democratic processes’” 
because it allows states to respond to local issues.
148
 Giving more power to 
states diffuses power from a distant and centralized federal authority that 
is not as attuned to individual concerns.
149
 Chief Justice Roberts’s vote to 
join Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion thus signifies his adherence to 
these broad views of state authority, not only as a structural feature of the 
 
 
 144. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012); Bond v. United 
States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 
 145. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
 146. See Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 460 (2011). 
 147. Bond, 131 S. Ct. at 2364. 
 148. Id. (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991)). 
 149. Id. 
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allocation of power in our system, but also as a means of individual 
liberty.
150
 Federalism provides the basis for shifting power from the 
federal government to the states. 
The Court’s high-profile decision to uphold the Affordable Care Act in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius—which Chief 
Justice Roberts authored—follows this principle.151 Although the Court 
sustained the law’s “individual mandate” under Congress’s power to levy 
taxes, it limited significantly Congress’s powers under the Commerce 
Clause.
152
 Thus, Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion “left Congress 
with a great deal of power where it often has the least room to maneuver: 
imposing taxes.”153 At the same time, it curtailed Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause, which is more often the constitutional basis 
for congressional action.
154
 Indeed, the opinion’s opening salvo could 
explain just as accurately the Court’s view of election-related legislation: 
“In our federal system, the National Government possesses only limited 
powers; the States and the people retain the remainder.”155 Of course, that 
is true as a general matter about any constitutional adjudication. The real 
question relates to the interpretation and scope of Congress’s powers. The 
Court’s jurisprudence has curtailed that power in various areas, including 
election law. 
 
 
 150. Id. (“Federalism is more than an exercise in setting the boundary between different 
institutions of government for their own integrity. ‘State sovereignty is not just an end in itself: 
‘Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign 
power.’’”) (quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181, (1992)). 
 151. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 152. Id. at 2587 (Roberts, C.J.). 
 153. Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius: Five Takes, 40 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 807, 831 (2013). 
 154. Robert A. Schapiro & William W. Buzbee, Unidimensional Federalism: Power and 
Perspective in Commerce Clause Adjudication, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1199, 1209 (2003) (“Between 
1937 and 1995, the Court utilized multiple perspectives to find commerce clause connections 
sufficient to justify the assertion of federal regulatory power.”). 
 155. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2577; see Nicole Huberfeld, With Liberty and Access 
for Some: The ACA’s Disconnect for Women’s Health, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1357, 1387–88 (2013) 
(“The opening statement of Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion makes it clear that Court-enforced 
federalism will be central to the decision, describing federalism as a doctrine that protects the states in 
the name of individual liberty.”); Gillian E. Metzger, To Tax, To Spend, To Regulate, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 83, 98 (2012) (quoting Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2579–80) (“[C]onfidence in the Court’s ability to 
police federalism represents a core undercurrent of both Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion and the joint 
dissent. Despite his deference to Congress in sustaining the mandate under the tax power, the Chief 
Justice did not shy from articulating limits on Congress—insisting that ‘there can be no question that it 
is the responsibility of this Court to enforce the limits on federal power.’”). Roberts cited Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175–76 (1803)). But see Arnold H. Loewy, Chief Justice Roberts (A 
Preliminary Assessment), 40 STETSON L. REV. 763, 772–74 (2011) (suggesting that “there is good 
reason to believe that federal legislation, arguably trenching on state sovereignty, will have smoother 
sailing in the Roberts Court than it did in the Rehnquist Court”). 
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The Court, and Chief Justice Roberts in particular, is thus employing a 
long-term strategy to cabin congressional authority; the election law cases 
epitomize this principle. Although the federal government might win some 
isolated cases—such as Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council156—the underlying 
language and doctrine is hostile to federal power. States are granted more 
leeway in the process. The Roberts Court’s approach may also reflect 
another form of federalism: giving state courts a first pass at statutory 
analysis of their own state rules, rather than leaving it to a federal court, 
which is likely ill-equipped to construe a state law in conformity with the 
state legislature’s goals.157 But even if Roberts thinks he is moving the law 
incrementally, the consequences of this methodology are significant. It 
emboldens states to pass more restrictive voting rules that will be subject 
to less meaningful judicial review.
158
  
This explanation of the Court’s election law doctrine cuts against a 
perception that the Roberts Court may be less attuned than the Rehnquist 
Court was to principles of federalism.
159
 Chief Justice Roberts’s vote with 
the majority in United States v. Comstock,
160
 which upheld Congress’s 
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact a law allowing 
federal civil confinement of sexually violent criminals, might suggest that 
“[f]ederalism is the one area in which Chief Justice Roberts seems to differ 
from his predecessor.”161 But the trend in election law jurisprudence, along 
with Roberts’s language in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, suggest that Comstock may be an anomaly and that the 
 
 
 156. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); see also supra note 96. 
 157. See Dorf, supra note 98, at 273 n.164 (“Federalism presents an additional reason to reject 
facial invalidity. If a state statute does not plainly encompass within its scope the allegedly invalid 
applications, a federal court may assume that the state’s highest court will, in an appropriate case, 
construe the statute as inapplicable.”). 
 158. See infra Part IV.B. 
 159. See, e.g., Huberfeld, supra note 146, at 459 (“Although the Rehnquist Court’s federalism 
revolution has been much discussed, until recently observers have found the Roberts Court’s approach 
to federalism to be opaque, as the Court had not issued an opinion that luxuriates in federalism like the 
Rehnquist Court had done.”); Loewy, supra note 155, at 772–74; David A. King, Note, Formalizing 
Local Constitutional Standards of Review and the Implications for Federalism, 97 VA. L. REV. 1685, 
1716 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“[W]hile the Roberts Court has followed the Rehnquist Court’s lead 
in citing federalism principles to limit the scope of statutes infringing on state and local sovereignty, 
Chief Justice Roberts has also signaled greater deference to the federal government in cases involving 
state challenges to federal action.”). 
 160. 560 U.S. 126 (2010). 
 161. Loewy, supra note 155, at 772. But see Michael C. Dorf & Erwin Chemerinsky, Three Vital 
Issues: Incorporation of the Second Amendment, Federal Government Power, and Separation of 
Powers—October 2009 Term, 27 TOURO L. REV. 125, 143–44 (2011) (“[I]t is premature to assert that 
Comstock will put an end to what the Roberts Court will do, or that Comstock represents the fact that 
the Roberts Court will not necessarily extend what the Rehnquist Court did with regard to 
federalism.”). 
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emerging view from Bond and NFIB is more accurate: although trying to 
be incremental on the surface, the Roberts Court is following a federalism 
ideal in the allocation of power between Congress and the states. 
Understanding the election law cases through this lens reconciles the 
otherwise contradictory approaches discussed earlier in this Article.
162
 The 
Roberts Court is heeding to a theory of federalism, limiting Congress’s 
power as much as possible and elevating the states’ role in regulating 
various aspects of our democratic system. Its approach, cabining 
congressional authority but deferring to state election administration—
through its failure to scrutinize a state’s asserted justification for an 
election rule and allowing only as-applied challenges to state voting 
processes—is consistent with the Roberts Court’s overall conception of 
federalism. 
B. The Chief Justice’s Influence 
Ideologically-driven decision making also might explain the Court’s 
recent election law jurisprudence. In this realm it is not the outcome per 
se, but rather the message regarding the federal-state balance of power to 
run elections, that matters the most. In fact, at least one Justice may be 
pulling the strings—and it is not Justice Kennedy, commonly labeled the 
“swing” voter on the Court. Instead, Chief Justice Roberts, with his votes, 
written opinions, and assignment of opinions to other Justices, has had a 
tremendous impact on the scope of election law jurisprudence. Of course, 
Roberts would not be in the position to influence the doctrine as much had 
Justice Alito not replaced Justice O’Connor, resulting in the current 5–4 
ideological split on the Court. Moreover, Roberts has not necessarily 
provided the tiebreaking vote in these cases. He has, however, used his 
power as Chief Justice to move the Court in the direction he seeks. 
Roberts has been in the majority in every single election law case he 
has heard to date.
163
 Since Roberts became Chief Justice in the fall of 
2005, the Court has issued merits decisions with written opinions in 
twenty-four cases involving redistricting, campaign finance, or election 
administration.
164
 The Chief Justice has joined the majority opinion in 
 
 
 162. See supra Parts I–II. 
 163. Roberts did, however, write a decision concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part in a redistricting case in which the Court was extremely fractured. See League of 
United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006). 
 164. See McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434 (2014); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 
(2013); Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013); Tennant v. Jefferson 
Cnty. Comm’n, 133 S. Ct. 3 (2012) (per curiam); Am. Tradition P’ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 
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every case.
165
 No other Justice has been in the majority every time.
166
 
Chief Justice Roberts has written the majority opinion in seven of these 
election law cases, giving him more majority opinions in this field than 
any other Justice.
167
 Seven of the other opinions were per curiam, meaning 
 
 
2490 (2012) (per curiam); Perry v. Perez, 132 S. Ct. 934 (2012) (per curiam); Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s 
Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011); Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186 (2010); Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010); Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 
(2009); Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) (plurality opinion); Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 
555 U.S. 353 (2009); Brunner v. Ohio Republican Party, 555 U.S. 5 (2008) (per curiam); Davis v. 
FEC, 554 U.S. 724 (2008); Riley v. Kennedy, 553 U.S. 406 (2008); Crawford v. Marion Cnty. 
Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion); Wash. State Grange v. Wash. State Republican 
Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008); N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. López Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008); FEC v. 
Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449 (2007); Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437 (2007) (per curiam); 
Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1 (2006) (per curiam); League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 
399; Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230 (2006) (plurality opinion); Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 
U.S. 410 (2006) (per curiam). See also Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Shrinking Election 
Law Docket, 2001–2010: A Legacy of Bush v. Gore or Fear of the Roberts Court?, 10 ELECTION L.J. 
325, 332–33 (2011) (including Appendix that lists every election law case the Supreme Court decided 
from 2001–2010).  
 One additional case, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), was not about 
the operation of the election itself but instead concerned whether an elected judge was required to 
recuse himself in litigation involving one of the judge’s financial supporters. Chief Justice Roberts 
dissented in that case. Id. at 890 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Because the case did not involve 
redistricting, a campaign finance regulation, or another aspect of the election process and touched 
upon election issues only peripherally, I do not include the decision in my list of election-related cases. 
But see Hasen, supra at 333 (including Caperton in the list of election law cases). But even including 
Caperton in the list does not diminish the Chief Justice’s overall influence. 
 165. These numbers reflect an overall trend: Roberts has cast the second-fewest dissenting votes 
of any of the Justices, with only Kennedy dissenting in fewer cases. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. 
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL 
STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 136–37 (2013). 
 166. Justice Kennedy comes close—he did not join the majority at least in part in only one case. 
See Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 462 (Scalia, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.). That case is 
instructive, as it is a state election administration dispute involving Washington’s choice over its ballot 
design. Justice Scalia’s dissent, which Justice Kennedy joined, focuses on the First Amendment 
implications to political parties of the candidate designation feature of Washington’s top-two primary 
system. Id. at 462–64. Thus, if this case signifies a divergence in the jurisprudence between Chief 
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, it suggests that Justice Kennedy does not seem to defer as 
categorically to state election administration rules. 
Justice Kennedy also concurred in the judgment in López Torres, 552 U.S. at 209 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
In addition, Justice Alito’s vote has been influential, as he has joined the majority opinion all but 
twice, dissenting once and concurring in the judgment once. See Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 
2270 (Alito, J., dissenting); Crawford, 553 U.S. at 204 (Scalia, J., concurring, joined by Alito, J.). 
 167. McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1440; Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2618; Bennett, 131 S. Ct. at 
2813; Reed, 561 U.S. at 189; Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist., 557 U.S. at 195; Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 354; 
Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 454. 
 The next most frequent author during this same time period was Justice Kennedy, who wrote three 
majority or plurality opinions. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 317; Bartlett, 556 U.S. at 5; League of 
Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 408.  
 Justice Scalia wrote two majority opinions. See Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2251; Lopez 
Tórres, 552 U.S. at 197. 
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that he might have had a hand in those cases as well. In fact, researchers 
attempting to identify the author of per curiam opinions, based on the 
language used, predict that Roberts is either the most likely or second-
most likely author of five of the seven election law per curiam opinions 
during his tenure to date.
168
 Thus, fourteen of the Roberts Court’s twenty-
four cases involving election law were either authored by the Chief 
himself or were per curiam, with a strong likelihood that Roberts wrote 
many of the per curiam decisions. Roberts also penned concurring 
opinions in Citizens United (campaign finance), Washington State Grange 
(election administration), and League of Latin American Citizens 
(redistricting).
169
  
In addition, as the Chief, Roberts selects the opinion writers when he is 
in the majority, so he has given himself more election law assignments 
than any other Justice. This is consistent with the view that the Chief 
assigns himself the most salient and important cases.
170
 His choice of an 
author other than himself might reflect the scope of the opinion he seeks; 
for example, selecting Justice Thomas to write the majority in Washington 
State Grange assured an approach that would be highly deferential to the 
state, setting out the distinction between facial and as-applied challenges 
that the Court later invoked a few weeks later in Crawford, the voter ID 
case. Similarly, allowing Justice Stevens to write the controlling opinion 
in Crawford, which relied upon this as-applied procedural distinction, may 
have allowed Roberts to maintain a veneer of “incrementalism” in the 
Court’s jurisprudence even though the doctrine in essence sanctioned voter 
ID laws. 
The language in Roberts’s opinions demonstrates the ad hoc nature of 
the procedural tools the Court has used to decide these cases, as well as his 
adherence to federalism ideals. For example, in Citizens United he wrote a 
concurrence to expound upon why he believed that judicial restraint did 
not limit the Court in its decision to overrule prior case law, but in 
Washington State Grange he concurred specifically to explain why the 
 
 
 168. William Li et al., Using Algorithmic Attribution Techniques to Determine Authorship in 
Unsigned Judicial Opinions, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 503, 529–32 tbl.9 (2013) (predicting that 
Roberts was the most likely author of Tennant and Wisconsin Right to Life, and the second-most likely 
author in Bullock, Perez, and Lance). No other Justice was listed as frequently as Roberts as the most- 
or second-most likely author of the election law per curiam cases. Justice Kennedy is next, listed as the 
most likely author in Perez and Purcell, and the second-most likely author in Tennant and Brunner. Id. 
 169. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 
459 (Roberts, C.J., concurring); League of Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 492 (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
 170. See Linda Greenhouse, Chief Justice Roberts in His Own Voice: The Chief Justice’s Self-
Assignment of Majority Opinions, 97 JUDICATURE 90, 96–97 (2013).  
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facial challenge was inappropriate, that is, why the Court should heed to 
judicial restraint.
171
 He did little to reconcile these approaches, not even 
citing Washington State Grange in his Citizens United opinion. Similarly, 
his majority opinion in Shelby County is infused with a discussion of 
federalism and the federal-state balance of power in regulating elections, 
thus highlighting the federalism aspect of the Court’s voting rights 
jurisprudence.
172
 
Therefore, based on the sheer number of his written opinions, as well 
as the language and analysis he has used, Chief Justice Roberts has had a 
significant impact on the recent evolution of election law. His theories on 
the federal-state allocation of authority to run elections have led the Court 
to strike down federal voting rules and campaign finance restrictions, but 
to reject the claims of plaintiffs asserting individual rights-based 
challenges to state election administration laws. 
Plaintiffs seeking judicial relief from restrictive state voting rules likely 
understand Chief Justice Roberts’s deference to state legisltures and 
therefore may be bringing fewer cases to the Supreme Court. As Professor 
Rick Hasen has demonstrated, during 2001–2010 the Court received far 
fewer petitions for review of election law questions than in previous 
decades.
173
 However, there was an uptick in conservative petition filing, 
particularly to challenge campaign finance regulations.
174
 As Professor 
Hasen explains, “there is some evidence that liberal litigants are more 
wary of filing petitions in election law cases before the more conservative 
Roberts Court.”175 Professor Hasen, however, attributes this changing 
strategy to the replacement of Justice O’Connor, a moderate, with Justice 
Alito, a conservative.
176
 The Court’s changing composition may explain 
some of this shift and certainly may have flipped the Court in particular 
cases. But the evidence is more complex and suggests that Chief Justice 
Roberts may be having a greater impact on the actual doctrinal evolution, 
at least with respect the jurisprudential direction of deferring more readily 
to a state’s voting processes. That is, Justice Alito may have helped to 
change certain outcomes in 5–4 decisions, but Chief Justice Roberts has 
played a significant role in charting the more general doctrinal trend 
identified in Parts I and II. 
 
 
 171. Compare Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372–73, with Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 459–61. 
 172. Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2623. 
 173. See Hasen, supra note 164, at 328–29. 
 174. Id. at 331–32. 
 175. Id. at 331. 
 176. Id. at 331–32. 
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In sum, one explanation for the current scope of recent Supreme Court 
election law jurisprudence is Chief Justice Roberts’s influence in these 
cases. Certainly, the change in Court personnel, with Justice Alito taking 
Justice O’Connor’s seat, has tipped the balance in many cases toward 
Roberts’s view. But added detail and nuance paints a more complete 
picture, showing how Roberts is affecting the doctrine on a deeper level. 
As described above, Roberts has joined every majority and authored more 
opinions than any other Justice. As the Chief, he is able to assign himself 
to write the majority opinion, which he has done seven times. In other 
cases, he has assigned the opinion to a fellow Justice in the majority, and 
even this choice may be a strategic move to dictate the scope of the 
opinion.
177
 Most significantly, he has used these cases to restrict 
congressional oversight and to defer to states in how they run elections. He 
has done so, however, not by explicitly identifying this doctrine, but 
through judicial maneuvers that define the level of scrutiny afforded to the 
government’s asserted interests and the distinction between facial and as-
applied challenges, depending on whether it is a federal or state statute 
under review. In the end, the Chief himself may be responsible, at least in 
part, for the Court’s current deference to states to run elections and its 
desire to push Congress out of the field as much as possible. 
IV. DOCTRINAL INCONGRUENCE AND DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES OF 
DEFERRING TO STATES TO RUN ELECTIONS 
Underlying the Court’s recent election law jurisprudence is skepticism 
toward congressional power to regulate elections and a corresponding 
deference to state election rules. The Court has given greater leeway to 
states to administer elections with little judicial oversight. But there are at 
least two significant problems with this approach. First, it is 
constitutionally suspect. Second, it is alarming given the string of partisan-
motivated restrictive voting laws that states have recently enacted. This 
Part explores both reasons for rejecting the Court’s current deferential 
approach to states. It also calls on the Court to reverse its current trend and 
more carefully scrutinize a state’s rules involving election administration. 
Ultimately, the Court should adopt a test akin to strict scrutiny for 
restrictions on the right to vote and should require both Congress and state 
legislatures to provide specific, particularized rationales for election laws. 
 
 
 177. See Douglas, supra note 143, at 21 (identifying an ideal of “strategic compromise” to explain 
Justice Stevens’s controlling opinion in Crawford, which Chief Justice Roberts joined). 
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A. Constitutional Allocation of Election Law Authority 
Although the United States Constitution does not explicitly grant the 
right to vote,
178
 it allocates authority to administer federal elections. First, 
the Constitution states that “[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections . . . shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; 
but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such 
Regulations.”179 Under this “Elections Clause,” states are given primary 
authority to administer an election, but Congress may “make or alter” 
those rules “at any time.”180 Second, both Article I and the Seventeenth 
Amendment provide that voters in federal elections shall have the same 
“Qualifications” as voters for the state’s largest legislative chamber.181 But 
various other provisions of the U.S. Constitution cabin this state power to 
dictate the qualifications of voters. In particular, a state may not deny the 
right to vote on account of race (Fifteenth Amendment),
182
 sex (Nineteenth 
Amendment),
183
 inability to pay a poll tax (Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment),
184
 or age over eighteen years old (Twenty-Sixth 
Amendment).
185
 In addition, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment provides a significant backdrop of federal voting rights 
protection and limits a state’s authority to determine voter 
qualifications.
186
 Each of these constitutional amendments gives 
enforcement power to Congress through “appropriate legislation.”187  
Any voting rules that states promulgate therefore must be consistent 
with these federal requirements. Moreover, the Constitution contemplates 
 
 
 178. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89, 
95–101 (2014).  
 179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 180. Id. 
 181. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; see Franita Tolson, Protecting Political 
Participation Through the Voter Qualifications Clause of Article I, 56 B.C. L. REV. 159, 159 (2015) 
(arguing that Article I “incorporates both i) state constitutional law governing the right to vote and ii) 
the democratic norms that existed within the states at the founding as the basis for determining the 
qualifications of federal electors”). 
 182. U.S. CONST. amend. XV. 
 183. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 184. U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
 185. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 186. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
665 (1966). 
 187. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 5, XV § 2, XIX, XXIV § 2, XXVI § 2. For an examination of 
Reconstruction Republicans’ goal of giving the federal government the power to “construct 
constitutional politics” under the Fourteenth Amendment by enfranchising newly-freed slaves, see 
Mark A. Graber, Constructing Constitutional Politics: The Reconstruction Strategy for Protecting 
Rights (Sept. 2013) (unpublished working paper), available at http://digitalcommons.law. 
umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1390/. 
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a significant role for Congress in regulating the election process, 
particularly for state-run elections for federal office.
188
 Contrary to the 
implicit message from current Supreme Court doctrine, states do not have 
limitless power over their election rules.  
Indeed, the original debate over the Elections Clause suggested that the 
Framers sought to give significant power to Congress over the regulation 
of elections.
189
 Proponents of the clause understood it “more to be a grant 
of power to Congress than to the states.”190 The delegates to the 
constitutional convention believed that “electoral oversight power was 
essential to national government” and that “control over elections [was] 
inherent in the idea of sovereignty.”191 James Madison’s view was that 
“congressional oversight is a check not only on state legislatures 
abdicating their duty to seat representatives, but also on their political 
maneuverings.”192 Ultimately, the Framers’ understanding was that “the 
structure of the Elections Clause is meant to allow Congress to police state 
legislative affronts to republican government.”193 
Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Arizona v. Inter Tribal 
Council,
194
 the Court had echoed the Framers’ general understanding of 
the Elections Clause as giving Congress broad power to regulate elections. 
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, the Court invalidated an Arkansas 
law that prohibited a candidate from appearing on the ballot for Congress 
if the person had already served three terms in the U.S. House of 
Representatives or two terms in the U.S. Senate.
195
 The Court held that this 
ballot restriction violated Congress’s ability to determine the qualifications 
of its members under Article I, Sections 4 and 5 and was not a state-
permitted “times, places and manner” regulation under the Elections 
Clause.
196
 Moreover, as Justice Stevens wrote for the majority, “[t]he 
Framers intended the Elections Clause to grant States authority to create 
procedural regulations, not to provide States with license to exclude 
 
 
 188. Because states typically run their elections for federal and state offices simultaneously, the 
rules that apply to federal elections usually apply for state elections as well. See, e.g., Pamela S. 
Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individuals, 38 MCGEORGE L. 
REV. 917, 927 (2007) (“As a practical matter, this power over mixed elections gives Congress leverage 
over the electoral process as a whole, since few jurisdictions can afford to run dual election systems.”). 
 189. See Jamal Greene, Note, Judging Partisan Gerrymanders Under the Elections Clause, 114 
YALE L.J. 1021, 1030–34 (2005). 
 190. Id. at 1031. 
 191. Id. at 1032. 
 192. Id. at 1033. 
 193. Id. at 1039. 
 194. 133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
 195. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995). 
 196. Id. at 804–05. 
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classes of candidates from federal office.”197 Under this reasoning, states 
have the initial authority to dictate procedural aspects of the voting 
process, but potential congressional alteration cabins that power 
significantly. Similarly, in Cook v. Gralike, the Court struck down a 
required ballot designation for candidates who would not support term 
limits by concluding that the Elections Clause prohibits states from 
“attempt[ing] to ‘dictate electoral outcomes,’” thereby reducing a state’s 
influence on the election process.
198
 
The Court also previously recognized that the Constitution limits a 
state’s ability, as compared to Congress, to dictate voter qualifications. In 
Oregon v. Mitchell, the Court held that Congress could compel states to 
permit eighteen-year-olds to vote in federal elections based on federal 
authority under the U.S. Constitution.
199
 Although the Court was fractured 
on the source of this power, with Justice Black finding Congress’s 
authority within the Elections Clause and four other Justices resting on the 
Equal Protection Clause,
200
 the holding was clear: although states have the 
initial role of determining voter qualifications, the Constitution gives 
Congress the final authority to set minimum standards.  
The enforcement provisions of the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-
Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments also provide support for the 
notion that Congress can play a significant role in regulating state electoral 
processes. As Justice Douglas stated in Oregon v. Mitchell, “the Civil War 
Amendments—the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—made vast in-
roads on the power of the States. Equal protection became a standard for 
state action and Congress was given authority to ‘enforce’ it.”201 In 
addition, the enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment allows 
Congress to “‘enforce’ equal protection by eliminating election 
inequalities,” which, according to Justice Douglas, “would seem quite 
broad.”202 Similarly, the Court once declared that “§ 5 [of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress 
 
 
 197. Id. at 832–33. 
 198. 531 U.S. 510, 525–26 (2001) (quoting U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 833–34). 
 199. 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Justice Black, announcing the judgments of the Court, stated, “In the 
very beginning the responsibility of the States for setting the qualifications of voters in congressional 
elections was made subject to the power of Congress to make or alter such regulations, if it deemed it 
advisable to do so.” Id. at 119. 
 200. Id. at 119–26; id. at 135 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 240 
(Brennan, White, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 201. Id. at 143 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 202. Id. 
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to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is 
needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”203  
Scholars have also understood Congress’s enforcement powers under 
these provisions to be expansive.
204
 As one commentator has explained, 
“[t]he phrase ‘Congress shall have power to enforce’ appears in seven of 
the first twenty-five amendments. In six of those amendments it has either 
been construed to give Congress far-reaching enforcement powers or is 
consistent with such a construction.”205 Although the Court in City of 
Boerne v. Flores limited the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
enforcement provision to permit only laws that are “congruen[t] and 
proportional[]” to the problem Congress seeks to remedy,206 this does not 
change the extensive nature of congressional authority so long as Congress 
compiles the requisite record. Moreover, the Court has recognized that 
“congressional remedial and prophylactic power is at its strongest when 
Congress acts to remedy or prevent the kinds of practices that the Court 
has subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny,”207 which would include 
protecting the fundamental right to vote.
208
 
Today’s Court, however, has a different understanding of the 
constitutional allocation of power between Congress and the states to run 
elections, limiting Congress’s role and elevating states’ authority. The 
Court has simultaneously claimed that Congress’s powers under the 
Elections Clause are “broad” while restricting the reach of Congress’s 
authority to regulate aspects of the election process.
209
 Specifically, in 
Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council, Justice Scalia wrote for the majority that 
“the Elections Clause empowers Congress to regulate how federal 
 
 
 203. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
 204. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Reconstruction, Felon Disenfranchisement, and the Right to Vote: 
Did the Fifteenth Amendment Repeal Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment?, 92 GEO. L.J. 259, 284 
(2004) (“Congress and the courts have recognized authority far broader under the Fifteenth 
Amendment than can exist under Section 2 [of the Fourteenth Amendment].”); Karlan, supra note 188, 
at 927 n.55 (“Section 2 of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment also gives Congress broad enforcement 
powers with regard to the voting rights of older Americans.”). Cf. Franita Tolson, The Constitutional 
Structure of Voting Rights Enforcement, 89 WASH. L. REV. 379, 400–01 (2014) (arguing that section 2 
of the Fourteenth Amendment enhances Congress’s authority under its section 5 enforcement power). 
 205. Eric S. Fish, Note, The Twenty-Sixth Amendment Enforcement Power, 121 YALE L.J. 1168, 
1182 (2012). 
 206. 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997). 
 207. Pamela S. Karlan, Section 5 Squared: Congressional Power to Extend and Amend the Voting 
Rights Act, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 13 (2007); see also id. at 10–16 (explaining Congress’s broad 
enforcement powers under the Fifteenth Amendment). 
 208. For another discussion of the deference the Court used to show Congress, specifically with 
respect to the Voting Rights Act, see Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 80, at 500–13. 
 209. Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253 (2013). 
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elections are held, but not who may vote in them.”210 That is, the Court’s 
understanding of the Constitution’s federal-state allocation of authority 
gives Congress some control, but only in very limited areas.
211
 The 
analysis takes away any role for Congress in determining voter 
qualifications.  
The Court missed the other crucial component of the constitutional 
allocation of authority to regulate elections. Under Oregon v. Mitchell, 
Congress has the prerogative to supersede a state’s rules on voter 
qualifications under the Elections Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, or 
a voting-specific constitutional amendment.
212
 That is, the Court failed to 
read the constitutional clauses relating to voting holistically and in concert 
with one another.
213
 The Court in Inter Tribal Council dealt with Oregon 
v. Mitchell in a footnote by attempting to distinguish it, but in reality the 
Court overturned the case’s main premise.214 Justice Scalia claimed that 
because five Justices in that case did not agree on a rationale for 
Congress’s authority to set the voting age for federal elections, the case 
was of “minimal precedential value.”215 As an initial matter, Justice 
Scalia’s vote count in Oregon v. Mitchell is disingenuous, as Justice 
Douglas did not state explicitly that the Elections Clause did not confer 
this power; he instead simply rested his analysis on the Fourteenth 
Amendment.
216
 Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile a statement that 
Congress may override a state’s voting age rules with a statement that 
Congress has no power whatsoever to dictate voter qualifications. Arizona 
v. Inter Tribal Council effectively overruled the rationale behind Oregon 
v. Mitchell, and thus limited the substantive reach of Congress’s authority 
under both the Elections Clause and the relevant constitutional 
amendments. In the process, the Court restricted congressional oversight 
and gave more power to the states to administer elections. 
 
 
 210. Id. at 2257. 
 211. Id. This is why Justice Scalia determined that any time Congress acts pursuant to a valid area 
of federal regulation it necessarily preempts a competing state law. Id. at 2256–57. 
 212. See 400 U.S. 112, 119 (1970); see also id. 143 (Douglas, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
 213. See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748 (1999); see also Tolson, 
supra note 204, at 394–404 (making a similar argument with respect to the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 214. Inter Tribal Council, 133 S. Ct. at 2258 n.8. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Compare id. (citing Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 143) with Mitchell, 400 U.S. at 143 (Douglas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (footnote omitted) (“Much is made of the fact that Art. I, § 4, 
of the Constitution gave Congress only the power to regulate the ‘Manner of holding Elections,’ not 
the power to fix qualifications for voting in elections. But the Civil War Amendments—the Thirteenth, 
Fourteenth, and Fifteenth—made vast in-roads on the power of the States.”). 
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Similarly, the Court failed to examine Congress’s constitutional 
authority for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act in its recent decision 
gutting the preclearance mechanism.
217
 Writing for the Court, Chief 
Justice Roberts held that “‘the Framers of the Constitution intended the 
States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the 
power to regulate elections.’”218 Although the Court acknowledged that 
Congress retains “significant control over federal elections,”219 it did not 
situate the Voting Rights Act within any of Congress’s powers in the 
Constitution. But Congress surely has broad authority to “make or alter” 
state regulations under the Elections Clause and enforcement power under 
the Fifteenth Amendment—which was in fact the initial rationale for the 
Voting Rights Act.
220
 The Court elevated a state’s sovereignty in 
administering its voting process by sidestepping any meaningful 
discussion of Congress’s role in regulating elections. 
Professor Franita Tolson has cogently explained why this approach is 
constitutionally incorrect, showing how Congress’s power under both the 
Elections Clause and the Equal Protection Clause means that Congress’s 
authority to regulate elections is paramount over states: 
[T]he Elections Clause serves as the baseline for the relationship 
between Congress and the states with respect to elections. And since 
the Elections Clause gives Congress final policymaking authority 
over federal elections and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments extend this authority to state elections, any judicially 
enforced federalism norm in favor of state power is illegitimate.
221
 
It follows that there is a difference between a state’s autonomy to prescribe 
election rules as an initial matter and Congress’s absolute sovereignty to 
override those regulations.
222
 Congress is the ultimate sovereign for 
elections.
223
 Thus, in its election law decisions the Court improperly 
“ignores that the Elections Clause gives the states strong autonomy power 
over elections and leaves sovereignty with Congress. The organizational 
structure of the Clause itself is not really federalist, but reflects a 
decentralized organizational structure that is often confused with 
 
 
 217. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 218. Id. at 2623 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461–62 (1991)). 
 219. Id. 
 220. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). 
 221. Franita Tolson, Reinventing Sovereignty?: Federalism as a Constraint on the Voting Rights 
Act, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1195, 1201 (2012). 
 222. Id. at 1248–49. 
 223. See id. 
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federalism.”224 The Court’s recent decisions discussed above epitomize 
this faulty logic. 
In sum, expansive deference to states, and a corresponding limitation 
placed on congressional authority, is contrary to the constitutional 
allocation of power between federal and state governments to regulate 
elections. Although states retain an important role in determining the 
“times, places and manner” of running elections and dictating voter 
qualifications as an initial matter, the Constitution explicitly limits this 
power if Congress chooses to act, either under the Elections Clause, the 
Equal Protection Clause, or a voting-specific constitutional amendment. 
The Court’s current approach is inconsistent with the plain reading of 
these provisions. The Court should revert to its prior understanding of 
Congress’s authority to regulate elections, ending its deference to states 
and thereby imposing more rigorous scrutiny on state voting laws.  
B. Consequences of the Court’s Current Approach: Partisan-Based State 
Voting Laws 
Many states, emboldened by the Court’s lax review of election 
regulations, have passed stringent, partisan-based election administration 
rules in recent years. Although a state might try to justify the laws based 
on a generalized interest in “election integrity,” the real motivation seems 
to be an effort to achieve partisan gain. Across the South, Republican-
controlled legislatures have recently passed voter ID laws and other 
election-related bills, all in the name of “election integrity.” But the 
evidence shows that these laws are not targeted to root out any fraud that 
actually exists in our system. The Court’s failure to require a state to 
justify its laws with a more specific interest than election integrity, and its 
welcoming of piecemeal, as-applied litigation that allows state laws 
generally to stay on the books, has opened the door to strict voting 
regulations.
225
  
 
 
 224. Id. at 1247. 
 225. The 2014 election cycle added another factor to the Supreme Court’s deference to state 
election processes: a desire not to change election rules too close to Election Day. Just weeks before 
the election, the Court issued stays in cases from Ohio, North Carolina, Wisconsin, and Texas, saying 
that the lower courts’ decisions came too close to the election and would cause confusion for election 
administration. In three of these cases—from Ohio, North Carolina, and Texas—the rulings had the 
result of allowing the state to implement a law that the lower courts had found unconstitutional. In the 
Wisconsin case, by contrast, the Court stayed the Seventh Circuit’s decision that had permitted the 
state to implement its new voter ID requirement. All four cases suggest that deference to a state’s 
current election process is the most important factor in a last-minute challenge to election rules. See 
Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9 (2014) (mem.) (Texas); Frank v. Walker, 135 S. Ct. 7 (2014) (mem.) 
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The actual underlying purpose of these laws is often an attempt to 
achieve partisan electoral advantage. Partisanship, however, is not a valid 
justification for rules about how our elections operate.
226
 Election laws 
should be neutral, enacted without an attempt to achieve political 
advantage. Indeed, the Court has said that states may not seek to affect 
election outcomes through their election regulations.
227
 These kinds of 
rules derogate the foundation of our democratic structure, as they call into 
question the validity of electoral results and create the appearance of bias 
or unfairness. The Court should respond by more rigorously and broadly 
testing the constitutionality of state voting regulations, especially when 
states can muster only generic justifications for the rules. 
Recent election legislation demonstrates both the partisan nature of 
these rules and the failure of states to provide any meaningful justification 
for the laws. In the summer of 2013, for instance, North Carolina passed a 
comprehensive voter bill
228
 shortly after the Court effectively invalidated 
the preclearance mechanism of the Voting Rights Act.
229
 Professor Rick 
Hasen characterized this bill as the most restrictive voting law in the 
country since the Civil Rights movement:  
It is a combination of cutbacks in early voting, restrictions on voter 
registration, imposition of new requirements on voters such as 
photo identification in voting, limitations on poll worker activity to 
help voters, and other actions which as a whole cannot be 
interpreted as anything other than an effort to make it harder for 
some people—and likely poor people, people of color, old people 
and others likely to ‘skew Democratic’—to vote.230  
Governor Pat McCrory, who signed the bill, justified it based on concerns 
of election fraud. In an op-ed, he wrote:  
 The need for photo ID has been questioned by those who say 
voter fraud isn’t a problem in North Carolina. However, assuming 
 
 
(Wisconsin); North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.) (North 
Carolina); Husted v. NAACP, 135 S. Ct. 42 (2014) (mem.) (Ohio).  
 226. See Ringhand, supra note 16, at 309. 
 227. See Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 525–26 (2001). 
 228. See Tom Foreman, Jr., NC Governor Signs Measure Requiring Voter ID, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Aug. 12, 2013, 11:17 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/mccrory-quietly-signs-sweeping-nc-elections-
bill, archived at http://perma.cc/55M-NAT7. 
 229. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 230. See Rick Hasen, Thoughts on the Road Ahead in North Carolina, ELECTION LAW BLOG, 
(Aug. 12, 2013, 9:19 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54296, archived at http://perma.cc/AY29-
CWF2.  
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fraud isn’t a threat when multimillion dollar campaigns are trying to 
win in a state where millions of votes are cast is like believing 
oversight isn’t needed against Wall Street insider trading.231  
But this glosses over the crucial question: Is there any actual evidence in 
North Carolina of any kind of attempted voter fraud that the new 
restrictive rules would address? The Supreme Court’s current 
jurisprudence, which sanctions a general interest in “election integrity,” 
does not require the state to answer that question. Indeed, the Fourth 
Circuit upheld most of North Carolina’s 2013 voting law, issuing a 
preliminary injunction against the implementation of only two provisions: 
the rollback of same-day registration and the new rule that forbids the state 
from counting ballots cast out-of-precinct, thus leaving the voter ID law 
intact (although that portion of the law does not go into effect until 
2016).
232
 The Supreme Court then stayed the invalidation of those two 
provisions for the 2014 election, meaning that the state was allowed to 
implement its law in 2014.
233
 Yet the evidence strongly suggests that 
North Carolina does not have a fraud problem that would justify its 
restrictive voting rules. As Colin Powell remarked, “You can say what you 
like, but there is no voter fraud . . . . How can it be widespread and 
undetected?”234 
The story was similar in Texas. Within hours of the Court’s decision in 
Shelby County to strike down a portion of the Voting Rights Act, the 
state’s Attorney General announced that Texas would begin enforcing its 
new voter ID law that a federal court had previously blocked.
235
 Other 
southern states, such as Mississippi and Alabama, followed suit in 
implementing their own voter ID laws.
236
 Wisconsin, too, has been subject 
 
 
 231. Pat McCrory, Op-Ed., N.C. Governor: Protect Election Integrity, USA TODAY (Aug. 29, 
2013, 12:59 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2013/08/28/voter-photo-id-early-voting-
north-carolina-gov-pat-mccrory/2724925/, archived at http://perma.cc/3FWR-9TCA.  
 232. League of Women Voters v. North Carolina, 796 F.3d 224 (4th Cir. 2014). 
 233. North Carolina v. League of Women Voters, 135 S. Ct. 6 (2014) (mem.). 
 234. John Murawski & John Frank, Colin Powell Slams NC’s New Voting Law in Speech at 
Raleigh CEO Forum, NEWS OBSERVER (Aug, 22, 2013), http://www.newsobserver.com/2013/08/ 
22/3127638/colin-powell-slams-ncs-new-voting.html, archived at http://perma.cc/594U-XGWY. 
 235. See Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 
2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/06/us/politics/after-Supreme-Court-ruling-states-rush-to-enact-
voting-laws.html?pagewanted=all.  
 236. Id. 
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to the “voting wars,” adopting a voter ID law and debating rules on what 
documents the state will accept to verify a voter’s residence.237  
The Court’s partial invalidation of the Voting Rights Act in Shelby 
County opened the door for many of these states to implement new voter 
laws, as several of the states could not have put these regulations into 
place previously without federal approval.
238
 But it was not just Shelby 
County that led to this increase in strict voter ID requirements and other 
partisan-based restrictive voting laws. Crawford, the Supreme Court 
decision that deferred to Indiana’s general interest in election integrity 
even though there was little actual evidence of voter fraud, was the 
catalyst for widespread adoption of stringent voter ID requirements.
239
 The 
Court’s overall deference to states in their election administration bolsters 
a state’s case for passing the laws. As the Washington Post lamented in an 
editorial, “[m]any of the [North Carolina] law’s reforms have little good 
justification.”240 But current doctrine—including both Crawford and 
Shelby County—makes it difficult to mount a successful constitutional 
challenge to such a law. 
 
 
 237. See Reid Wilson, Voting Wars Coming to Wisconsin, WASH. POST (Oct. 14, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/10/14/voting-wars-coming-to-wisconsin/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/Z2M-LYXD. 
 238. Richard L. Hasen, Will the GOP’s North Carolina End Run Backfire?, THE DAILY BEAST 
(July 24, 2003), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/07/24/will-the-gop-s-north-carolina-end-
run-backfire.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TYM7-LAUQ (“Anyone wondering about the 
importance of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling hobbling a key part of the Voting Rights Act needs 
look no further than North Carolina, whose Republican legislature is poised to enact one of the strictest 
voting laws in the nation, one that will make it harder to register and vote, likely hurting minority 
voters most.”). 
 239. Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently admitted that he was “wrong” in 
upholding Indiana’s voter ID law when the case was before his court. See John Schwartz, Judge in 
Landmark Case Disavows Support for Voter ID, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2013), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2013/10/16/us/politics/judge-in-landmark-case-disavows-support-for-voter-id.html. A lawyer 
familiar with the case responded,  
“The consequences of this mistake were immense. Had Posner switched his vote, Judge 
Sykes may have as well, and the odds of [the Supreme Court] hearing this case decline 
exponentially. Indiana’s law would thus not have become a model for other voter suppression 
laws across the nation, and Crawford’s majority opinion [at the Seventh Circuit] may have 
been written by Judge Evans, striking down Indiana’s law. That would have dramatically 
altered the course of election law and set a completely different tone and direction, 
particularly in light of Posner’s prodigious reputation.” 
Ind. Decisions—Judge Posner Has Second Thoughts on His Voter ID Decision; Says He Didn’t Know 
Enough, IND. LAW BLOG (Oct. 13, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://indianalawblog.com/archives/2013/10/ 
ind_decisions_j_120.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DP4A-TA9T. 
 240. Editorial, Voting Rights Act Should Be Revived by Congress, Not by Justice Suing States, 
WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/voting-rights-act-should-be-
revived-by-congress-not-by-justice-suing-states/2013/10/06/9dafe01e-2c75-11e3-8ade-a1f23cda135e_ 
story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/NNP7-K46R. 
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These laws might have a tangible effect on election outcomes, 
especially in a close race, as they can alter the electorate by restricting who 
can vote. Partisan legislators understand this possibility, which is why the 
debate surrounding the laws has become so contentious in recent years. 
Thus, states are not really interested in just “election integrity” when 
passing these rules. This factor suggests that a careful court would allow 
broader facial challenges and likely invalidate the laws if the states were 
subject to a higher burden on the interest prong of the constitutional 
analysis.  
In our current political climate, Democratic-affiliated voters are most 
likely to suffer the denial of their voting rights because of strict voter ID 
laws.
241
 Indeed, a study that the North Carolina Secretary of State 
conducted about its new law demonstrated that the law would affect 
Democratic voters the most.
242
 Republican legislators across the country 
have admitted that they support voter ID laws to suppress the Democratic 
vote totals.
243
 Although it is unclear how many elections a voter ID law 
would impact, it could play a significant role in a close election when the 
number of voters that the law affects exceeds the margin of victory.
244
 
Moreover, it is inherently concerning to deny someone’s fundamental 
right to vote without a particularized justification. 
Although criticizing Republican-led voting regulations might seem to 
be a partisan-laden argument itself, it simply follows from the practical 
effect of the Supreme Court’s current doctrine given that Republicans 
control more state legislatures. If Democratic majorities were passing 
onerous election laws for no good reason other than an attempt to gain 
partisan advantage, then those laws too should undergo more rigorous 
 
 
 241. See Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election Bd., 472 F.3d 949, 954 (7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., 
dissenting). 
 242. See Nate Cohn, Finally, Real Numbers on Voter ID, NEW REPUBLIC (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113986/voter-id-north-carolina-law-hurts-democrats, archived at 
http://perma.cc/N692-CP6N (“The North Carolina data confirms what many suspected: Voter ID laws 
have a disparate impact on non-white and Democratic voters.”). 
 243. See Juliet Lapidos, Yeah, Voter ID Hurts Democrats, N.Y. TIMES TAKING NOTE BLOG (July 
19, 2013, 1:48 PM), http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/19/yeah-voter-id-hurts-democrats/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/LB4Q-G6SS (reporting on voter ID in Pennsylvania); Jamelle Bouie, 
Republicans Admit Voter-ID Laws Are Aimed at Democratic Voters, THE DAILY BEAST (Aug. 28, 
2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/08/28/republicans-admit-voter-id-laws-are-aimed-
at-democratic-voters.html, archived at http://perma.cc/TKS2-PT3T. 
 244. See Cohn, supra note 242 (noting that “despite a disproportionate impact on Democratic-
leaning groups, the electoral consequences of voter ID seem relatively marginal” but recognizing that a 
voter ID law could alter a close election). See generally Michael J. Pitts, Empirically Assessing the 
Impact of Photo Identification at the Polls Through an Examination of Provisional Balloting, 24 J.L. 
& POL. 475 (2008) (gathering data on the number of voters who go to the polls on Election Day 
without a valid ID and cast a provisional ballot). 
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judicial scrutiny. Elections should be run without partisan considerations, 
and election administration should be politically neutral. For example, if a 
Democratic state legislature liberalized voter registration requirements so 
much that non-citizens could easily vote and thereby affect the election, 
then a court should scrutinize the true reason behind that new rule. If there 
is no evidence-based justification beyond partisanship, then a court should 
strike down the law. For instance, Democrats inappropriately sought to 
keep Ralph Nader off the 2004 presidential election ballot in many states 
for partisan advantage.
245
 Had there been a challenge, a court would have 
been well suited to question the state’s true reasons behind its ballot access 
requirements and invalidate the law. 
Election rules should not be based on who would gain the most at the 
ballot box; they should instead focus primarily on opening the electoral 
process for the voter, with a concomitant acknowledgement of the state’s 
need to administer a fair and fraud-free election. The Court’s current 
deferral to states, combined with the partisan makeup of most state 
legislatures, has created an environment in which Republicans are 
emboldened to pass stricter voter access laws to achieve electoral 
advantage in the name of “election integrity.” If the roles were reversed, 
however, the problem would be just as concerning. 
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that the Court’s current 
divergence of approaches between federal and state election rules is 
dangerous for the fair administration of elections. Unchecked, state 
legislators with one-party control are motivated to enact partisan-based 
voting rules to entrench themselves in power. Congress does not have this 
same incentive both because currently it has a sizeable number of 
members from each major political party (making partisan-infused election 
rules less likely to pass in today’s political environment) and because the 
Court already scrutinizes carefully Congress’s actual (or perceived) 
motivations for an election law. But the Court should analyze all election 
administration laws under the same inquiry: has the legislature provided 
specific, particularized, and articulable reasons to justify its law? 
The Court should not blindly defer to a state’s interest in election 
integrity. Instead, it must scrutinize a state voting law carefully to ensure 
 
 
 245. See Rob Richie, Let’s Not Give Chris Christie a Pass for Election Chicanery, SALON (Oct. 
15, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.salon.com/2013/10/15/lets_not_give_chris_christie_a_pass_for_ 
election_chicanery/, archived at http://perma.cc/PSF7-GX6F, archived at http://perma.cc/Q8G7-
VUPN (“Democrats resorted to every trick in the book to keep independent Ralph Nader off the ballot 
in key states in the 2004 presidential race, even as Republican backers tried to help Nader repeat the 
‘spoiler’ role he played in 2000.”). 
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that the state actually has a justified reason for imposing the regulation, in 
the same manner it now considers congressional election statutes. This 
more careful review would require the state to present evidence to support 
a law that burdens the right to vote.
246
 It does not mean that states are 
powerless to enact rules for administering an election to prevent fraud. But 
it does require a state to justify its laws with “data that certain types of 
election fraud exist and affect the health and integrity of the electoral 
system.”247 
The Court should treat congressional and state election regulations in 
the same manner. Both legislatures have the obligation to justify their 
election rules with specific, articulable rationales. Moreover, courts should 
require the legislature to rebut an inference of partisanship as the real 
motivation behind a law, particularly if there is one-party control in the 
state and the regulation hinders the ability of the minority party’s 
supporters to exercise their fundamental right to vote. This puts Congress 
and the states on the same footing, with Congress having the final 
authority to protect voting rights. This understanding of the federal-state 
balance is exactly what our constitutional structure envisions.  
Indeed, sometimes Congress may be better suited than states to enact 
uniform rules for election administration, such as when it mandated 
improved voting machines across the country in the Help America Vote 
Act of 2002.
248
 This is not to suggest that Congress should take over the 
day-to-day operation of our election system—even if it is constitutionally 
empowered to do so. There is significant room for states to experiment 
with election regulations, and this “laboratory” of the states is beneficial 
for learning what works and what does not.
249
 But when Congress does 
choose to act, the Court should not subject its laws to higher scrutiny than 
state statutes receive. Put differently, the Court is unwarranted in deferring 
to states when it does not provide Congress with that same courtesy.  
 
 
 246. See Joshua A. Douglas, The Foundational Importance of Participation: A Response to 
Professor Flanders, 66 OKLA. L. REV. 81, 99 (2013) (describing the importance of weighing states’ 
administrative needs with the citizens’ constitutional right to vote); Benson, supra note 26, at 32 
(arguing that “in deferring to state efforts to address, or not to address, election fraud, courts should 
embrace an analysis that considers quantitative and qualitative evidence of the prevalence of the 
particular type of fraud, as well as the constitutional rights that are implicated by the furthering of the 
fraudulent act”). 
 247. Benson, supra note 26, at 32. 
 248. 52 U.S.C. § 20901–21145 (2014). 
 249. See Daniel P. Tokaji, Laboratories of Election Freedom, 8 ELECTION L.J. 267, 267 (2009) 
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eds., 2008)). 
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To put Congress and state legislatures on the same footing, the Court 
could either ratchet up the level of scrutiny for both federal and state 
election laws, or give deference to both bodies. But lowering judicial 
scrutiny would be a mistake given the fundamental nature of voting rights 
to our entire democratic structure.
250
 When a regulation impacts the ability 
of voters to exercise their fundamental right, neither legislature should 
enjoy blind deference; courts should require both federal and state 
legislatures to justify their laws with specific, articulable evidence 
regarding the actual governmental interests behind a law. This heightened 
scrutiny will best protect the fundamental right to vote under a uniform 
doctrine: the right to vote is paramount, subject only to regulations that a 
legislature can justify with specific evidence of the need for the law. 
Heightened judicial scrutiny helps courts root out partisanship as the basis 
for an election statute. Often a state will have a valid regulatory or 
economic need for an election law that ties directly to its ability to 
administer an election fairly and efficiently.
251
 But a court should require a 
state to articulate that need with specificity, instead of resting on 
generalized and amorphous notions of “election integrity” without any 
evidence of the harm the state is actually trying to combat. The Court also 
should not narrow the scope of possible litigation to only as-applied 
challenges, as courts should invalidate onerous, partisan-motivated laws 
before they infringe voters’ rights in an actual election. 
The test should be the same for both federal and state election 
regulations: Has the legislature compiled specific evidence regarding the 
harm it is trying to avoid or the particular reasons for the law it enacts?
252
 
Moreover, the Court should permit facial challenges when a law infringes 
an individual’s right to vote without a specific, permissible justification. 
Through the current unequal treatment, states are emboldened to enact 
restrictive election administration laws in the name of “election integrity,” 
even though the real purpose behind the law is partisanship. More 
meaningful judicial review will at least give states pause before passing 
 
 
 250. See Douglas, supra note 246, at 84–85. 
 251. See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974) (“[A]s a practical matter, there must be a 
substantial regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than 
chaos, is to accompany the democratic processes.”). 
 252. Professor Rick Hasen has suggested a similar formulation, stating that “courts should read 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to require the legislature to produce substantial 
evidence that it has a good reason for burdening voters and that its means are closely connected to 
achieving those ends.” Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About 
Republican Efforts to Make It Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 
58, 62 (2014). 
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such laws, because they will have to ensure they have a valid justification, 
beyond just political gain, for promulgating the rule. States will know that 
they will be subject to broader and more meaningful judicial oversight. 
CONCLUSION 
Current Supreme Court doctrine defers too readily to states to 
administer elections. In the process, the Court has removed Congress from 
the elections business. It has not done so explicitly, but rather through two 
judicial maneuvers that have the combined effect of placing tremendous 
trust in states: lowering the bar for the state interest prong of the 
constitutional analysis, and forbidding facial challenges to state rules on 
election administration. The Court has not treated Congress in the same 
manner. This is wrong. The U.S. Constitution gives the federal 
government significant scope to promulgate election regulations. 
Moreover, the current deferential approach emboldens states to pass 
partisan-based laws with an eye toward affecting elections, and a state may 
justify such laws simply by claiming that is trying to ensure “election 
integrity.” The Court should change this jurisprudence by requiring states 
to provide a more detailed justification for an election law and allowing 
broader use of facial challenges. Voting, as a fundamental right, deserves 
robust protection from the courts. Scrutinizing state election laws more 
closely will help to achieve this worthy goal. 
 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol92/iss3/5
